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How Legal Representation Affects Case Outcomes: An Empirical Perspective from Taiwan

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  • Kuo‐Chang Huang

Abstract

Since the late 1980s, interdisciplinary scholars have conducted several empirical studies to examine to what extent legal representation affects case outcomes. Yet most of these empirical endeavors concentrate on legal representation in informal proceedings. This article revisits this question and reports the result of an independent empirical study using the official data on more than 100,000 civil cases terminated in Taiwan from 2000 to 2006. This study shows that cases are most unlikely to be settled when both parties are represented, while parties are most likely to settle a case when neither is represented. This study also shows that legal representation has no significant bearing on the case outcomes when the parties go to trial. A representation selection effect is proposed to explain these empirical results. This article argues that parties are quite apt to make deliberate and reasonable decisions on whether to seek legal representation in Taiwan and that the continental judge's active role in the adjudication process helps to explain why pro se litigants fare reasonably well in formal litigation. This study suggests that the influence of lawyers on how a case is disposed of in Taiwan may not be as strong as their colleagues' influence in the United States.

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  • Kuo‐Chang Huang, 2008. "How Legal Representation Affects Case Outcomes: An Empirical Perspective from Taiwan," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(2), pages 197-238, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:5:y:2008:i:2:p:197-238
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1740-1461.2008.00123.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Yun-chien Chang & Su-hao Tu, 2020. "Two-way selection between flat-fee attorneys and litigants: theoretical and empirical analyses," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 131-164, February.
    2. Claudine Desrieux & Romain Espinosa, 2019. "Case selection and judicial decision-making: evidence from French labor courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 57-88, February.
    3. Huang, Kuo-Chang & Chen, Kong-Pin & Lin, Chang-Ching, 2010. "Does the type of criminal defense counsel affect case outcomes?: A natural experiment in Taiwan," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 113-127, June.
    4. Peter Grajzl & Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl & Katarina Zajc, 2016. "Inside post-socialist courts: the determinants of adjudicatory outcomes in Slovenian commercial disputes," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 85-115, February.
    5. Kwai Hang Ng, 2011. "Is There a Chinese Common Law? An Empirical Study of the Bilingual Common‐Law System of Hong Kong," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(1), pages 118-146, March.
    6. Lin, Chang-Ching & Chang, Yun-chien & Chen, Kong-Pin, 2020. "Knowledge in youth is wisdom in age: an empirical study of attorney experience in torts litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    7. Cui Wei & Wang Zhiyuan, 2017. "The Selection of Litigation against Government Agencies: Evidence from China," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-41, November.
    8. David Gliksberg, 2014. "Does the Law Matter? Win Rates and Law Reforms," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(2), pages 378-407, June.
    9. Earnhart, Dietrich & Rousseau, Sandra, 2019. "Are lawyers worth the cost? Legal counsel in environmental criminal court cases," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).

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