A General Framework for Robust Contracting Models
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DOI: 10.3982/ECTA17386
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- Halil .Ibrahim Bayrak & c{C}au{g}{i}l Koc{c}yiu{g}it & Daniel Kuhn & Mustafa c{C}elebi P{i}nar, 2022. "Distributionally Robust Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification," Papers 2211.15122, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
- Paul Duetting & Michal Feldman & Inbal Talgam-Cohen, 2024. "Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey," Papers 2412.16384, arXiv.org.
- Paul Dütting & Michal Feldman & Daniel Peretz & Larry Samuelson, 2024. "Ambiguous Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(6), pages 1967-1992, November.
- Weinschenk, Philipp, 2024. "Incentives and performance under two-dimensional moral hazard," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 225(C), pages 107-115.
- Rosenthal, Maxwell, 2023. "Robust incentives for risk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
- Shang Liu & Hanzhao Wang & Zhongyao Ma & Xiaocheng Li, 2025. "How Humans Help LLMs: Assessing and Incentivizing Human Preference Annotators," Papers 2502.06387, arXiv.org.
- Chang Liu, 2022. "Robust Contracts with Exploration," Papers 2212.00157, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
- Ashwin Kambhampati, 2024. "Robust Performance Evaluation of Independent and Identical Agents," Papers 2401.16542, arXiv.org.
- Peter Zhang, 2023. "Distributionally Robust Principal-Agent Problems and Optimality of Contracts," Papers 2303.07468, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
- Tal Alon & Paul Dutting & Yingkai Li & Inbal Talgam-Cohen, 2022. "Approximate Optimality of Linear Contracts Under Uncertainty," Papers 2211.06850, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2025.
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