Are superstar directors effective in corporate social responsibility performance? An empirical analysis of sustainable development goals
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DOI: 10.1002/csr.2369
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- Rodolfo Damiano & Chiara Di Maria, 2024. "Exploring the role of companies and sustainability disclosure in achieving sustainable development goals: A focus on zero hunger and social inclusion," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 31(4), pages 2715-2732, July.
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