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Relative Performance Evaluation and the Ratchet Effect

Author

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  • Pablo Casas‐Arce
  • Martin Holzhacker
  • Matthias D. Mahlendorf
  • Michal Matějka

Abstract

When targets depend on past performance, incentives are adversely affected by the ratchet effect. We provide theory and evidence that incorporating past peer performance into targets can alleviate this adverse incentive effect. In particular, we present an analytical model that characterizes optimal target revisions as a function of past own and past peer performance. We then test the predictions of our model using data on 2008–2010 performance targets from 354 units of a governmental agency responsible for reintegration of the long‐term unemployed into the labor market. As a unique feature of our data, we have information on peer group quality, defined as the extent to which peer performance is informative about common shocks. Consistent with our model, we find that higher peer group quality (a) increases sensitivity of target revisions to past peer performance, (b) reduces sensitivity of target revisions to past own performance, and (c) reduces the ratchet effect as reflected in managerial incentives to withhold end‐of‐year effort. Évaluation de la performance relative et effet d'entraînement Lorsque les objectifs visés dépendent de la performance passée, l'effet d'entraînement a une incidence négative sur les motivations. Les auteurs formulent et démontrent la théorie selon laquelle l'intégration de la performance passée des pairs dans les objectifs peut atténuer cette incidence négative sur les motivations. Ils proposent notamment un modèle analytique dans lequel les révisions d'objectif optimal sont définies comme étant fonction de la performance passée du sujet et de la performance passée des pairs. Ils testent ensuite les prédictions du modèle à l'aide de données s'échelonnant de 2008 à 2010 sur les objectifs de performance de 354 unités d'un organisme gouvernemental responsable de la réintégration sur le marché du travail de chômeurs de longue date. Une caractéristique exclusive des données qu'ils analysent réside dans l'information qu'elles contiennent au sujet de la qualité des groupes de pairs, définie comme étant la mesure dans laquelle la performance des pairs nous renseigne sur les turbulences économiques communes. Conformément à leur modèle, les auteurs observent qu'une meilleure qualité du groupe de pairs a) accroît la sensibilité de la révision des objectifs à la performance passée des pairs, b) réduit la sensibilité de la révision des objectifs à la performance passée du sujet et c) réduit l'effet d'entraînement qui se manifeste dans la motivation des dirigeants à la rétention de leurs efforts en fin d'exercice.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Casas‐Arce & Martin Holzhacker & Matthias D. Mahlendorf & Michal Matějka, 2018. "Relative Performance Evaluation and the Ratchet Effect," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 35(4), pages 1702-1731, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:35:y:2018:i:4:p:1702-1731
    DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12385
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Heckman, James J & Heinrich, Carolyn & Smith, Jeffrey, 1997. "Assessing the Performance of Performance Standards in Public Bureaucracies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 389-395, May.
    2. Courty, Pascal & Marschke, Gerald, 1997. "Measuring Government Performance: Lessons from a Federal Job-Training Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 383-388, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wei, Chen, 2020. "Can job rotation eliminate the Ratchet effect: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 66-84.
    2. Wei Cai & Yue Chen & Shiva Rajgopal & Li Azinovic-Yang, 2024. "Diversity targets," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 2157-2208, September.
    3. Arnold, Markus C. & Artz, Martin & Tafkov, Ivo D., 2024. "The effect of target transparency on managers’ target setting decisions," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    4. Christoph Feichter & Isabella Grabner, 2020. "Empirische Forschung zu Management Control – Ein Überblick und neue Trends [Empirical Management Control Reserach—An Overview and Future Directions]," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 149-181, June.
    5. Manthei, Kathrin & Sliwka, Dirk & Vogelsang, Timo, 2021. "Information Provision, Incentives, and Attention: A Field Experiment on Facilitating and Influencing Managers' Decisions," IZA Discussion Papers 14199, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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