Discussion of “The Relation Between Analysts' Forecasts of Long†Term Earnings Growth and Stock Price Performance Following Equity Officeringâ€
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.2000.tb00909.x
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References listed on IDEAS
- Lin, Hsiou-wei & McNichols, Maureen F., 1998. "Underwriting relationships, analysts' earnings forecasts and investment recommendations," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 101-127, February.
- Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-686.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Kothari, S.P. & Loutskina, E. & Nikolaev, V., 2006. "Agency Theory of Overvalued Equity as an Explanation for the Accrual Anomaly," Discussion Paper 2006-103, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Ljungqvist, Alexander & Marston, Felicia & Starks, Laura T. & Wei, Kelsey D. & Yan, Hong, 2007.
"Conflicts of interest in sell-side research and the moderating role of institutional investors,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 420-456, August.
- Ljungqvist, Alexander & Marston, Felicia & Yan, Hong & Starks, Laura T & Wei, Kelsey D., 2005. "Conflicts of Interest in Sell-Side Research and the Moderating Role of Institutional Investors," CEPR Discussion Papers 5001, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kothari, S.P. & Loutskina, E. & Nikolaev, V., 2006. "Agency Theory of Overvalued Equity as an Explanation for the Accrual Anomaly," Other publications TiSEM 3f380fcf-b0ca-4198-86f8-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Cowen, Amanda & Groysberg, Boris & Healy, Paul, 2006. "Which types of analyst firms are more optimistic?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 119-146, April.
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