IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jfinan/v63y2008i6p2785-2815.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge Fund Registration

Author

Listed:
  • STEPHEN BROWN
  • WILLIAM GOETZMANN
  • BING LIANG
  • CHRISTOPHER SCHWARZ

Abstract

Mandatory disclosure is a regulatory tool intended to allow market participants to assess operational risk. We examine the value of disclosure through the controversial SEC requirement, since overturned, which required major hedge funds to register as investment advisors and file Form ADV disclosures. Leverage and ownership structures suggest that lenders and equity investors were already aware of operational risk. However, operational risk does not mediate flow‐performance relationships. Investors either lack this information or regard it as immaterial. These findings suggest that regulators should account for the endogenous production of information and the marginal benefit of disclosure to different investment clienteles.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Brown & William Goetzmann & Bing Liang & Christopher Schwarz, 2008. "Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge Fund Registration," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(6), pages 2785-2815, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:63:y:2008:i:6:p:2785-2815
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01413.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01413.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01413.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Doidge, Craig & Karolyi, G. Andrew & Stulz, Rene M., 2004. "Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth more?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 205-238, February.
    2. Getmansky, Mila & Lo, Andrew W. & Makarov, Igor, 2004. "An econometric model of serial correlation and illiquidity in hedge fund returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 529-609, December.
    3. Amitabh Dugar & Siva Nathan, 1995. "The Effect of Investment Banking Relationships on Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts and Investment Recommendations," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(1), pages 131-160, September.
    4. Gompers, Paul & Lerner, Josh, 1999. "Conflict of Interest in the Issuance of Public Securities: Evidence from Venture Capital," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 1-28, April.
    5. Himmelberg, Charles P. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1999. "Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 353-384, September.
    6. Demsetz, Harold & Villalonga, Belen, 2001. "Ownership structure and corporate performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 209-233, September.
    7. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    8. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    9. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    10. Newey, Whitney & West, Kenneth, 2014. "A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 33(1), pages 125-132.
    11. Heitor V. Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2006. "A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2637-2680, December.
    12. Harvey, Campbell R. & Lins, Karl V. & Roper, Andrew H., 2004. "The effect of capital structure when expected agency costs are extreme," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 3-30, October.
    13. Brown, Stephen J, et al, 1992. "Survivorship Bias in Performance Studies," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(4), pages 553-580.
    14. Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-686.
    15. repec:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:5:p:1589-1622 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Clifford G. Holderness & Randall S. Kroszner & Dennis P. Sheehan, 1999. "Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 435-469, April.
    17. Edward I. Altman, 1968. "Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis And The Prediction Of Corporate Bankruptcy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 23(4), pages 589-609, September.
    18. de Fontnouvelle, Patrick & Dejesus-Rueff, Virginia & Jordan, John S. & Rosengren, Eric S., 2006. "Capital and Risk: New Evidence on Implications of Large Operational Losses," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(7), pages 1819-1846, October.
    19. Fama, Eugene F & MacBeth, James D, 1973. "Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 607-636, May-June.
    20. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October.
    21. Oren Fuerst, 1998. "A Theoretical Analysis of the Investor Protection Regulations Argument for Global Listing of Stocks," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm106, Yale School of Management.
    22. Agarwal, Vikas & Naik, Narayan Y., 2000. "Multi-Period Performance Persistence Analysis of Hedge Funds," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 327-342, September.
    23. Stephen J. Brown & William N. Goetzmann & James Park, 2001. "Careers and Survival: Competition and Risk in the Hedge Fund and CTA Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(5), pages 1869-1886, October.
    24. Liang, Bing, 2000. "Hedge Funds: The Living and the Dead," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 309-326, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stephen Brown & William Goetzmann & Bing Liang & Christopher Schwarz, 2008. "Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge Fund Registration," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(6), pages 2785-2815, December.
    2. James, Hui & Benson, Bradley W. & Wu, Chen (Ken), 2017. "Does CEO ownership affect payout policy? Evidence from using CEO scaled wealth-performance sensitivity," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 328-345.
    3. Brown, Stephen & Goetzmann, William & Liang, Bing & Schwarz, Christopher, 2012. "Trust and delegation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 221-234.
    4. Fabisik, Kornelia & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger & Stulz, René M. & Taillard, Jérôme P., 2021. "Why are firms with more managerial ownership worth less?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(3), pages 699-725.
    5. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri & Lins, Karl V., 2008. "Changes in insider ownership and changes in the market value of the firm," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 92-106, April.
    6. Huang, Kershen & Petkevich, Alex, 2016. "Corporate bond pricing and ownership heterogeneity," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 54-74.
    7. Georgeta Vintila & Stefan Cristian Gherghina, 2014. "Insider Ownership and the Value of the Bucharest Stock Exchange Listed Companies: Convergence-of-Interest or Entrenchment Effect?," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 4(1), pages 183-195.
    8. Ryan Lafond & Sugata Roychowdhury, 2008. "Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 101-135, March.
    9. Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2008. "One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 51-91.
    10. Gaspar, Jose-Miguel & Massa, Massimo, 2007. "Local ownership as private information: Evidence on the monitoring-liquidity trade-off," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 751-792, March.
    11. Nam Hoai Tran & Chi Dat Le & David McMillan, 2020. "Ownership concentration, corporate risk-taking and performance: Evidence from Vietnamese listed firms," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 1732640-173, January.
    12. Grosfeld, Irena, 2009. "Large shareholders and firm value: Are high-tech firms different?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 259-277, September.
    13. Chen, Carl R. & Guo, Weiyu & Mande, Vivek, 2003. "Managerial ownership and firm valuation: Evidence from Japanese firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 267-283, July.
    14. Zhong Qin & Vinod Mishra & Russell Smyth, 2016. "An empirical examination of endogenous ownership in Chinese private enterprises," Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(4), pages 513-530, October.
    15. Shan, Yuan George & Troshani, Indrit & Tarca, Ann, 2019. "Managerial ownership, audit firm size, and audit fees: Australian evidence," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 18-36.
    16. Weiß, Christian, 2010. "The Ownership Concentration of Firms: Three Essays on the Determinants and Effects," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 30247, September.
    17. Krishna Reddy & Stuart Locke & Frank Scrimgeour, 2010. "The efficacy of principle‐based corporate governance practices and firm financial performance," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 6(3), pages 190-219, June.
    18. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    19. Benson, Bradley W. & Chen, Yu & James, Hui L. & Park, Jung Chul, 2020. "So far away from me: Firm location and the managerial ownership effect on firm value," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    20. Irena Grosfeld, 2006. "Ownership concentration and firm performance: Evidence from an emerging market," Working Papers halshs-00590485, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:63:y:2008:i:6:p:2785-2815. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/afaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.