IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/canjec/v40y2007i2p493-514.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Skating on thin ice: rule changes and team strategies in the NHL

Author

Listed:
  • Anurag N. Banerjee
  • Johan F. M. Swinnen
  • Alfons Weersink

Abstract

. In an effort to stimulate a more exciting and entertaining style of play, the National Hockey Association (NHL) changed the rewards associated with the results of overtime games. Under the new rules, teams tied at the end of regulation both receive a single point, regardless of the outcome in overtime. A team scoring in the sudden‐death 5‐minute overtime period would earn an additional point. Prior to the rule change in the 1999–2000 season, the team losing in overtime would receive no points while the winning team earned 2 points. This paper presents a theoretical model to explain the effect of the rule change on the strategy of play during both the overtime period and the regulation time game. The results suggest that under the new overtime, format equally powerful teams will play more offensively in overtime resulting in more games decided by a sudden‐death goal. The results also suggest that while increasing the likelihood of attacking in overtime, the rule change would have a perverse effect on the style of play during regulation by causing them to play conservatively for the tie. Empirical data confirm the theoretical results. The paper also shows that increasing the rewards to a win in regulation time would prevent teams from playing defensively during regular time. Dans un effort pour rendre le spectacle plus excitant, la Ligue Nationale de Hockey (LNH) a changé les récompenses attachées aux résultats des joutes en surtemps. Les nouvelles règles accordent un point à chaque équipe si le score est àégalité après la période réglementaire, quel que soit le résultat du jeu en surtemps. Une équipe qui compte dans la période supplémentaire de 5 minutes gagne un point additionnel. Avant les changements de règlements en 1999‐2000, l'équipe qui perdait en surtemps ne recevait aucun point et l'équipe gagnante en surtemps en recevait deux. Ce mémoire présente un modèle théorique qui explique l'effet du changement de règlements sur la stratégie des équipes tant en temps réglementaire qu'en surtemps. On suggère que des équipes également puissantes vont jouer plus offensivement en surtemps ce qui devrait entraîner plus de buts en surtemps. On suggère aussi que le changement de règlements va avoir un effet pervers sur le style de jeu en temps réglementaire en incitant à travailler plus défensivement pour au moins sauver l'égalité. Les données empiriques confirment ces conjectures théoriques. Le texte montre aussi que si on augmentait les récompenses attachées à une victoire en temps réglementaire, cela empêcherait que le jeu défensif se développe en temps réglementaire.

Suggested Citation

  • Anurag N. Banerjee & Johan F. M. Swinnen & Alfons Weersink, 2007. "Skating on thin ice: rule changes and team strategies in the NHL," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(2), pages 493-514, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:40:y:2007:i:2:p:493-514
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2007.00418.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5982.2007.00418.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1540-5982.2007.00418.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Palomino, F.A. & Rigotti, L. & Rustichini, A., 1998. "Skill, Strategy and Passion : An Empirical Analysis of Soccer," Discussion Paper 1998-129, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Maloney Michael T. & Terkun Kristina, 2002. "Road Warrior Booty: Prize Structures in Motorcycle Racing," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, April.
    3. Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Bognanno, Michael L, 1990. "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1307-1324, December.
    4. Jason Abrevaya, 2004. "Fit to be Tied," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 5(3), pages 292-306, August.
    5. Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick, 2000. "The Response of Workers to Wages in Tournaments," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 1(2), pages 99-123, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Egon Franck & Philipp Theiler, 2008. "One for sure or three maybe - Empirical evidence for overtime play from Swiss ice hockey," Working Papers 0024, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA), revised 2010.
    2. Franck Egon & Theiler Philipp, 2012. "One for Sure or Maybe Three: Empirical Evidence for Overtime Play from a Comparison of Swiss Ice Hockey and the NHL," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 232(3), pages 210-223, June.
    3. Stephen Dobson & John Goddard, 2008. "Strategic Behaviour and Risk Taking in Football," Working Papers 0805, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    4. Stephen Dobson & John Goddard, 2018. "Games of Two Halves: Non-Experimental Evidence on Cooperation, Defection and the Prisoner’s Dilemma," Review of Economic Analysis, Digital Initiatives at the University of Waterloo Library, vol. 10(3), pages 285-312, May.
    5. Niven Winchester & Raymond T. Stefani, 2009. "An innovative approach to National Football League standings using optimal bonus points," Working Papers 0905, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2009.
    6. Dobson, Stephen & Goddard, John, 2010. "Optimizing strategic behaviour in a dynamic setting in professional team sports," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 205(3), pages 661-669, September.
    7. Liam J.A. Lenten & Jan Libich & Petr Stehlík, 2013. "Policy Timing and Footballers' Incentives," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 14(6), pages 629-655, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Brad Humphreys & Bernd Frick, 2019. "Prize Structure and Performance: Evidence from NASCAR," Economies, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-13, October.
    2. Markus LANG & Alexander RATHKE & Marco RUNKEL, 2010. "The Economic Consequences Of Foreigner Rules In National Sports Leagues," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 31, pages 47-64.
    3. Banerjee, Anurag N. & Swinnen, Johan & Weersink, Alfons, 2004. "Skating on thin ice: rule changes and team strategies in the NHL," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0401, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    4. Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck & Martin Grossmann & Markus Lang, 2009. "Contest Theory and its Applications in Sports," Working Papers 0029, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA).
    5. Thierry Lallemand & Robert Plasman & François Rycx, 2005. "Women and competition in elimination tournaments: evidence from professional tennis data," DULBEA Working Papers 05-19.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    6. Todd A. McFall & Charles R. Knoeber & Walter N. Thurman, 2009. "Contests, Grand Prizes, and the Hot Hand," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 10(3), pages 236-255, June.
    7. Feddersen, Arne & Humphreys, Brad & Soebbing, Brian, 2012. "Cost Incentives in European Football," Working Papers 2012-13, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    8. Torgler, Benno & Schmidt, Sascha L & Frey, Bruno S., 2006. "The Power of Positional Concerns: A Panel Analysis," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt1z14v7zt, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    9. Thierry Lallemand & Robert Plasman & François Rycx, 2008. "Women and Competition in Elimination Tournaments," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 9(1), pages 3-19, February.
    10. Keith F. Gilsdorf & Vasant A. Sukhatme, 2008. "Testing Rosen's Sequential Elimination Tournament Model," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 9(3), pages 287-303, June.
    11. Clifford B. Sowell & Wm. Stewart Mounts Jr., 2005. "Ability, Age, and Performance," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 6(1), pages 78-97, February.
    12. William Chan & Pascal Courty & Li Hao, 2009. "Suspense: Dynamic Incentives in Sports Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 24-46, January.
    13. Benno Torgler & Sascha L. Schmidt & Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "Relative Income Position And Performance: An Empirical Panel Analysis," IEW - Working Papers 268, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    14. Brian Hill, 2014. "The Heat Is On," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 15(4), pages 315-337, August.
    15. Keith F. Gilsdorf & Vasant Sukhatme, 2008. "Tournament incentives and match outcomes in women's professional tennis," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(18), pages 2405-2412.
    16. Matthew Hood, 2006. "The Purse Is Not Enough," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 7(3), pages 289-308, August.
    17. Benno Torgler & Markus Schaffner & Bruno S. Frey & Sascha L. Schmidt, 2008. "Looking Awkward When Winning and Foolish When Losing: Inequity Aversion and Performance in the Field," IEW - Working Papers 369, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    18. Justina A.V. Fischer & Benno Torgler, 2006. "Does Envy Destroy Social Fundamentals? The Impact of Relative Income Position on Social Capital," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2006 2006-04, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    19. Migheli, Matteo, 2019. "Competing for promotion: Are “THE BEST” always the best?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 149-161.
    20. Juan D. Carrillo, 2007. "Penalty Shoot-Outs," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 8(5), pages 505-518, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:40:y:2007:i:2:p:493-514. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-5982 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.