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Collective consumption and welfare

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  • Olivier Donni

Abstract

. In this paper, we present a collective model of household demand based on Pareto‐efficiency. In addition, we suppose that (a) each household member is egoistic and consumption is purely private, (b) there is a set of distribution factors and (c) there is one exclusive good. Then we derive the testable restrictions that are implied by this theoretical setting and show how welfare comparisons at the individual level can be performed. JEL classification: D11 Consommation collective et bien‐être. Dans cet article, nous présentons un modèle collectif de demande du ménage fondé sur l’efficacité au sens de Pareto. En plus, nous adoptons les postulats suivants: (a) chaque membre du ménage est égoiste et la consommation est purement privée, (b) il existe un ensemble de facteurs de distribution, et (c) il existe un bien exclusif. Ensuite, nous dérivons les restrictions théoriques que les demandes du ménage doivent satisfaire et nous montrons comment des comparaisons de bien‐être au niveau individuel peuvent être effectuées.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Donni, 2006. "Collective consumption and welfare," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(1), pages 124-144, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:39:y:2006:i:1:p:124-144
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2006.00341.x
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    1. Alderman, Harold, et al, 1995. "Unitary versus Collective Models of the Household: Is It Time to Shift the Burden of Proof?," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 10(1), pages 1-19, February.
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    9. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2002. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 37-72, February.
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    1. Olivier Bargain & Olivier Donni, 2014. "Optimal Commodity Taxation and Redistribution within Households," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 81(321), pages 48-62, January.
    2. Donni, Olivier, 2006. "The Intrahousehold Allocation of Private and Public Consumption: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Data," IZA Discussion Papers 2137, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Gustavo J. Bobonis, 2009. "Is the Allocation of Resources within the Household Efficient? New Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(3), pages 453-503, June.
    5. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Donni, Olivier, 2009. "Non-unitary Models of Household Behavior: A Survey of the Literature," IZA Discussion Papers 4603, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory

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