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Can Human Development Bonds Reduce the Agency Costs of the Resource Curse?

Author

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  • Sperduto Luke

    (International Capital Markets, Allen & Overy LLP, 1 Bishops Square, London, UK)

Abstract

Especially in resource rich countries with weak institutions of governance, the interests of governments often diverge from those of their citizens and creditors. Sovereign bond contracts can potentially help align these interests, to the benefit of all parties, by indexing payment obligations to improvements in the health and education of the issuer’s citizenry. To that end, this Article proposes a Human Development Bond (HDB) with a variable coupon schedule that both insures issuers against recessions and incentivizes them to encourage investment in human capital when economic growth is strong. The potential benefits of such an instrument can only be realized, however, with significant support from the international community. Moreover, further empirical research is needed to calibrate the HDB’s coupon schedule to provide well-timed and appropriately sized debt relief.

Suggested Citation

  • Sperduto Luke, 2019. "Can Human Development Bonds Reduce the Agency Costs of the Resource Curse?," The Law and Development Review, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 191-245, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:lawdev:v:12:y:2019:i:1:p:191-245:n:7
    DOI: 10.1515/ldr-2018-0061
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