Politicians, Bureaucrats and Targeted Redistribution: The Role of Career Concerns
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- Ruben Enikolopov, 2010. "Politicians, Bureaucrats and Targeted Redistribution: The Role of Career Concerns," Working Papers w0148, New Economic School (NES).
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Working Papers
w0165, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Ruben Enikolopov, 2011. "Are Bureaucrats Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," Working Papers w0165, New Economic School (NES).
- Enikolopov, Ruben, 2018. "Are Bureaucrats Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," CEPR Discussion Papers 13051, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2011-01-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2011-01-23 (Positive Political Economics)
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