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¿Por qué el distanciamiento ideológico disminuye la provisión de bienes públicos?; una explicación basada en el empleo clientelar

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  • Leonardo A. Gatica Arreola

Abstract

Este artículo presenta un modelo de competencia política para analizar el efecto que tiene la distancia ideológica que hay entre dos partidos políticos que compiten por el apoyo de los ciudadanos sobre la provisión de bienes públicos. El principal resultado argumenta que la distancia ideológica entre los partidos y los ciudadanos tiene una relación negativa con la provisión de bienes públicos. En contraste con otros modelos teóricos, este resultado no se debe a problemas de cooperación o conflicto debido a la fragmentación y polarización de la ciudadanía, sino a la rentabilidad política del uso clientelar del empleo burocrático.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo A. Gatica Arreola, 2012. "¿Por qué el distanciamiento ideológico disminuye la provisión de bienes públicos?; una explicación basada en el empleo clientelar," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 39(1 Year 20), pages 27-51, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:39:y:2012:i:1:p:27-51
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Polarización; Competencia política; Eficiencia gubernamental; Empleo gubernamental; Clientelismo.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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