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Die Privatisierung öffentlichen Eigentums als Instrument der Wirtschaftspolitik: Privat- versus Staatseigentum an Unternehmen – praktische Umsetzung von Privatisierungsvorhaben und wirtschaftspolitische Schlussfolgerungen

Author

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  • Michael Böheim

    (WIFO)

Abstract

Der dritte Beitrag der WIFO-Artikelserie zum Thema "Privatisierung" beschäftigt sich mit der praktischen Umsetzung von Privatisierungsvorhaben und liefert zusammenfassende wirtschaftspolitische Schlussfolgerungen. Privatisierungsvorhaben sind langfristig nur auf Wettbewerbsmärkten ökonomisch erfolgreich und gesellschaftspolitisch akzeptiert. Ein "privatisierungswilliger" Staat steht vor der Herausforderung, ex ante die notwendigen Rahmenbedingungen für funktionierenden Wettbewerb zu schaffen und diesen ex post auch zu garantieren. Vor einer Privatisierung ist durch Liberalisierung eine Öffnung des Marktes für den Wettbewerb zu bewirken sowie durch eine entsprechende Regulierungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik zu begleiten, damit sich nachhaltig funktionierender Wettbewerb etablieren kann. Auf (gesellschafts )politischer Ebene kann die Akzeptanz von Privatisierungsvorhabenen durch Entideologisierung, die Herstellung von Transparenz sowie die Darstellung möglicher Alternativen ("Trade-offs") verbessert werden.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Böheim, 2011. "Die Privatisierung öffentlichen Eigentums als Instrument der Wirtschaftspolitik: Privat- versus Staatseigentum an Unternehmen – praktische Umsetzung von Privatisierungsvorhaben und wirtschaftspolitisc," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 84(11), pages 727-741, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wfo:monber:y:2011:i:11:p:727-741
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Privatisierung Wirtschaftspolitik;

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