IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/vrs/cinrer/v25y2019i85p30-62n2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why does cooperation work or fail? The case of EU-US sanction policy against Iran

Author

Listed:
  • Matera Paulina

    (University of Lodz, Faculty of International and Political Studies)

  • Matera Rafał

    (University of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology)

Abstract

In the article, we explore the factors which brought about the transatlantic coordination of the policy of imposing sanctions on Iran. We will mainly focus on the events in the 21st century when the new incentives for cooperation appeared due to the growing concern over the development of Iran’s nuclear programme. Considering the capabilities of using the tools of economic statecraft and diplomacy, we claim that the EU-US cooperation can be termed a co-leadership. The assessment and the reasons for the transatlantic break-up on this matter during the presidency of Donald Trump was examined using the concept of relative gains. We evaluate to what extent the initial goals were achieved in practice, and we also try to predict the possible consequences of the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Suggested Citation

  • Matera Paulina & Matera Rafał, 2019. "Why does cooperation work or fail? The case of EU-US sanction policy against Iran," Croatian International Relations Review, Sciendo, vol. 25(85), pages 30-62, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:cinrer:v:25:y:2019:i:85:p:30-62:n:2
    DOI: 10.2478/cirr-2019-0005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2478/cirr-2019-0005
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2478/cirr-2019-0005?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Drezner, Daniel W., 2000. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(1), pages 73-102, January.
    2. Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 1994. "Economic Diplomacy, Trade And Commercial Policy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 447.
    3. Moravcsik, Andrew, 1997. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(4), pages 513-553, October.
    4. Keohane, Robert O., 1986. "Reciprocity in international relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(1), pages 1-27, January.
    5. Powell, Robert, 1991. "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(4), pages 1303-1320, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. David Lektzian & Glen Biglaiser, 2014. "The effect of foreign direct investment on the use and success of US sanctions," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(1), pages 70-93, February.
    2. William Seitz & Alberto Zazzaro, 2020. "Sanctions and public opinion: The case of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 817-843, October.
    3. Andrea Gerlak & Jonathan Lautze & Mark Giordano, 2011. "Water resources data and information exchange in transboundary water treaties," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 179-199, May.
    4. Caruso Raul, 2003. "The Impact of International Economic Sanctions on Trade: An Empirical Analysis," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 1-36, April.
    5. Alexandra E. Cirone & Johannes Urpelainen, 2013. "Trade sanctions in international environmental policy: Deterring or encouraging free riding?," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 30(4), pages 309-334, September.
    6. Fritz W. Scharpf, 1994. "Games Real Actors Could Play," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(1), pages 27-53, January.
    7. Demena, B.A. & Benalcazar Jativa, G. & Reta, A.S. & Kimararungu, P.B. & van Bergeijk, P.A.G., 2021. "Does research on economic sanctions suffer from publication bias?," ISS Working Papers - General Series 674, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
    8. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1993. "Positive und negative Koordination in Verhandlungssystemen," MPIfG Discussion Paper 93/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    9. Mohammed Nuruzzaman, 2008. "Liberal Institutionalism and International Cooperation after 11 September 2001," International Studies, , vol. 45(3), pages 193-213, July.
    10. David Lektzian & Rimvydas Ragauskas, 2016. "The great blockade of Lithuania: Evaluating sanction theory with a case study of Soviet sanctions to prevent Lithuanian independence," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 19(4), pages 320-339, December.
    11. Park, Mi Sun & Lee, Hyowon, 2019. "Accountability and reciprocal interests of bilateral forest cooperation under the global forest regime," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 32-44.
    12. Jonas Tallberg & Thomas Sommerer & Theresa Squatrito, 2016. "Democratic memberships in international organizations: Sources of institutional design," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 59-87, March.
    13. Baran Han, 2018. "The role and welfare rationale of secondary sanctions: A theory and a case study of the US sanctions targeting Iran," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(5), pages 474-502, September.
    14. Reuven Glick & Alan M. Taylor, 2010. "Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic Impact of War," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 92(1), pages 102-127, February.
    15. Klaus H. Goetz & Ronny Patz & Theresa Squatrito, 2017. "Resourcing Global Justice: The Resource Management Design of International Courts," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 8, pages 62-74, August.
    16. James D. Morrow, 1997. "When Do “Relative Gains†Impede Trade?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 12-37, February.
    17. Vaclav Vlcek, 2023. "Who cares about the UN General Assembly? National delegations size from 1993 to 2016," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 14(2), pages 349-360, May.
    18. Jeffry Frieden & Stefanie Walter, 2019. "Analyzing inter-state negotiations in the Eurozone crisis and beyond," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 134-151, March.
    19. Anna Michalski, 2013. "Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: The Case of Denmark's and Sweden's Relations with China," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(5), pages 884-900, September.
    20. Senti Richard, 2006. "Argumente für und wider die Reziprozität in der WTO – Die Reziprozität als merkantilistisches Erbe in der geltenden Welthandelsordnung / The merits of reciprocity in the WTO," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 57(1), pages 315-340, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vrs:cinrer:v:25:y:2019:i:85:p:30-62:n:2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.sciendo.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.