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The great blockade of Lithuania: Evaluating sanction theory with a case study of Soviet sanctions to prevent Lithuanian independence

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  • David Lektzian

    (Texas Tech University, USA)

  • Rimvydas Ragauskas

    (Texas Tech University, USA)

Abstract

Previous work in political science has looked to dyadic, international, and domestic factors in senders and targets of sanctions for explanations of why they sometimes succeed and frequently fail. In this paper, we present a case study of the sanctions imposed by the Soviet Union over Lithuania’s declaration of independence in 1990. We examine the dyadic, international, and domestic factors that influenced the outcome of the sanctions and connect them to existing theoretical and empirical work in the literature. While dyadic and international factors played important roles, we find the strongest evidence for the role of domestic political factors in the Soviet Union and Lithuania in determining the outcome of the dispute.

Suggested Citation

  • David Lektzian & Rimvydas Ragauskas, 2016. "The great blockade of Lithuania: Evaluating sanction theory with a case study of Soviet sanctions to prevent Lithuanian independence," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 19(4), pages 320-339, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:intare:v:19:y:2016:i:4:p:320-339
    DOI: 10.1177/2233865916658851
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Val Samonis, 1995. "Transforming the Lithuanian Economy: from Moscow to Vilnius and from Plan to Market," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0042, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dizaji, S.F. & Lis, P. & Murshed, S.M. & Zweiri, M., 2020. "What the political economy literature tells us about blockades and sanctions," ISS Working Papers - General Series 130655, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.

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