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Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation

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  • Rogerson, William P

Abstract

This paper argues that regulatory institutions in defense procurement are (and necessarily must be) organized to create prizes for innovation in the form of positive economic profit on production contracts. This has a number of important policy implications. The values of the prizes on twelve major aerospace projects are estimated using stock-market data and are shown to be large. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Rogerson, William P, 1989. "Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1284-1305, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:97:y:1989:i:6:p:1284-1305
    DOI: 10.1086/261654
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    Cited by:

    1. Susan J. Guthrie & Hines, James R. Jr., 2011. "U.S. DEFENSE CONTRACTS DURING the TAX EXPENDITURE BATTLES of the 1980s," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 64(2), pages 731-751, June.
    2. Frode Meland & Odd Straume, 2007. "Outsourcing in contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 315-331, June.
    3. Giacomo Calzolari & Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad O. Stahl, 2021. "Relational Contracts and Trust in a High-Tech Industry," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_316, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    4. Giacomo Calzolari & Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad O. Stahl, 2019. "Trust, investment and competition: theory and evidence from German car manufacturers," CESifo Working Paper Series 7680, CESifo.
    5. Luo, Lianfa & Cheng, Zhiming & Ye, Qingqing & Cheng, Yanjun & Smyth, Russell & Yang, Zhiqing & Zhang, Le, 2024. "Nonmonetary awards and innovation: Evidence from winning China's Top Brand Contest," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    6. Marc Guyot & Radu Vranceanu, 1997. "Quelle réglementation pour le secteur de la Défense : l'expérience américaine," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 12(3), pages 167-193.
    7. Esqueda, Omar A. & Ngo, Thanh & Susnjara, Jurica, 2019. "The effect of government contracts on corporate valuation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 305-322.
    8. Gökçe Göktepe & Shanker Satyanath, 2013. "The economic value of military connections in Turkey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 531-552, June.
    9. Erik Snowberg & Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, 2011. "How Prediction Markets can Save Event Studies," CAMA Working Papers 2011-07, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    10. Luechinger, Simon & Moser, Christoph, 2014. "The value of the revolving door: Political appointees and the stock market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 93-107.
    11. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Calzolari, Giacomo & Felli, Leonardo & Koenen, Johannes & Stahl, Konrad, 2017. "Relational Contracts, Competition and Innovation: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers," CEPR Discussion Papers 12267, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Rajeev Goel, 2001. "R&D effects of incomplete procurement contracts," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(11), pages 697-699.
    13. Jeffrey P. Clemens & Parker Rogers, 2020. "Demand Shocks, Procurement Policies, and the Nature of Medical Innovation: Evidence from Wartime Prosthetic Device Patents," CESifo Working Paper Series 8781, CESifo.
    14. Antonio Fonfria & Paulina Correa-Burrows, 2010. "Effects Of Military Spending On The Profitability Of Spanish Defence Contractors," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(2), pages 177-192.
    15. Olivier Debande, 1997. "Le rôle du secteur privé dans le financement des infrastructures : une mise en perspective historique," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(2), pages 197-230.
    16. Vivek Bhattacharya, 2021. "An Empirical Model of R&D Procurement Contests: An Analysis of the DOD SBIR Program," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(5), pages 2189-2224, September.
    17. Yossef Spiegel, 1996. "The Role of Debt in Procurement Contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 379-407, September.
    18. William P. Rogerson, 1993. "Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process," Discussion Papers 1078, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    19. Kofi Nti, 2000. "Potential competition and coordination in a market-entry game," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 149-165, June.
    20. Michael, Steven C., 2000. "The effect of organizational form on quality: the case of franchising," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 295-318, November.
    21. Brennan, Timothy J. & Macauley, Molly & Whitefoot, Kate, 2011. "Prizes, Patents, and Technology Procurement: A Proposed Analytical Framework," RFF Working Paper Series dp-11-21-rev, Resources for the Future.
    22. S. Keith Berry, 2006. "Firm Incentives for Invention Prizes with Multiple Winners," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 83-95, Winter.
    23. Dieter Bös, 1999. "Inefficient R&D in Public Procurement: Negative Consequences of a Separation between Award and Actual Contract," CESifo Working Paper Series 208, CESifo.
    24. Sergei Severinov, 2008. "The value of information and optimal organization," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 238-265, March.

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