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Testing Neoclassical Competitive Theory in Multilateral Decentralized Markets

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  • John A. List

Abstract

Walrasian tatonnement has been a fundamental assumption in economics ever since Walras' general equilibrium theory was introduced in 1874. Nearly a century after its introduction, Vernon Smith relaxed the Walrasian tatonnement assumption by showing that neoclassical competitive market theory explains the equilibrating forces in "double-auction" markets. I make a next step in this evolution by exploring the predictive power of neoclassical theory in decentralized naturally occurring markets. Using data gathered from two distinct markets- the sports card and collector pin markets-I find a tendency for exchange prices to approach the neoclassical competitive model prediction after a few market periods.
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  • John A. List, 2004. "Testing Neoclassical Competitive Theory in Multilateral Decentralized Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(5), pages 1131-1156, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:112:y:2004:i:5:p:1131-1156
    DOI: 10.1086/422564
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    6. John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2002. "The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 215-233, February.
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    8. John List, 2002. "Testing neoclassical competitive market theory in the field: Some pilot results," Framed Field Experiments 00172, The Field Experiments Website.
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