Human Capital versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Dropouts
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DOI: 10.1086/322089
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- Kelly Bedard, "undated". "Human Capital Versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Drop-outs," Canadian International Labour Network Working Papers 19, McMaster University.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
- C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
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