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Race, Poverty, and American Tort Awards: Evidence from Three Data Sets

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  • Eric Helland
  • Alexander Tabarrok

Abstract

We investigate the impact of the race and income of the jury pool on trial awards. The average tort award increases as black and Hispanic county population rates increase and especially as black and Hispanic county poverty rates increase. An increase in the black county poverty rate of 1 percentage point tends to raise the average personal injury tort award by 3–10 percent. An increase in the Hispanic county poverty rate of 1 percentage point tends to raise awards by as much as 7 percent, although this effect is less well estimated. Forum shopping for high-poverty minority counties could raise awards by hundreds of thousands of dollars. Average awards decrease with increases in white (nonblack, non-Hispanic) poverty rates in two of our data sets, making these findings even more surprising. Awards increase with black and Hispanic county poverty rates even after controlling for a wide variety of other potential causes.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, 2003. "Race, Poverty, and American Tort Awards: Evidence from Three Data Sets," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 27-58, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:32:y:2003:p:27-58
    DOI: 10.1086/344560
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Issa Kohler‐Hausmann, 2011. "Community Characteristics and Tort Law: The Importance of County Demographic Composition and Inequality to Tort Trial Outcomes," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(2), pages 413-447, June.
    2. Matter, Ulrich & Stutzer, Alois, 2015. "Politico-economic determinants of tort reforms in medical malpractice," Working papers 2015/02, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    3. Edward Stringham & Todd Zywicki, 2011. "Rivalry and superior dispatch: an analysis of competing courts in medieval and early modern England," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 497-524, June.

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