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Conspiracy at the Pump

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  • Can Erutku
  • Vincent A. Hildebrand

Abstract

On the basis of evidence of price-fixing, in May 2006 the Canadian Competition Bureau targeted retail gasoline outlets in some local markets in the province of Quebec. In June 2008, criminal charges were filed against many individuals and companies operating in those local markets. We employ a differences-in-differences approach to determine whether the public announcement of the antitrust investigation triggered a reaction in one of the targeted markets. We find that the price of gasoline in the targeted market fell by 1.75 cents per liter after the public announcement of the investigation. We also briefly discuss how well the Stiglerian theory of collusion performs in this real-world conspiracy. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

Suggested Citation

  • Can Erutku & Vincent A. Hildebrand, 2010. "Conspiracy at the Pump," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 223-237, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:53:y:2010:i:1:p:223-237
    DOI: 10.1086/597761
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Clark & Jean-François Houde, 2014. "The Effect of Explicit Communication on pricing: Evidence from the Collapse of a Gasoline Cartel," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 191-228, June.
    2. Packalen, Mikko & Sen, Anindya, 2013. "Static and dynamic merger effects: A market share based empirical analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 12-24.
    3. Benjamin Atkinson, Andrew Eckert, and Douglas S. West, 2014. "Daily Price Cycles and Constant Margins: Recent Events in Canadian Gasoline Retailing," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    4. Stephanie Assad & Robert Clark & Daniel Ershov & Lei Xu, 2020. "Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market," CESifo Working Paper Series 8521, CESifo.
    5. Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick & Franck, Jens-Uwe, 2015. "Endogenous price commitment, sticky and leadership pricing: Evidence from the Italian petrol market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 32-48.
    6. Erutku, Can, 2012. "Testing post-cartel pricing during litigation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 339-342.
    7. González, Xulia & Moral, María J., 2019. "Effects of antitrust prosecution on retail fuel prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    8. Paul Zimmerman & John Yun & Christopher Taylor, 2013. "Edgeworth Price Cycles in Gasoline: Evidence from the United States," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(3), pages 297-320, May.
    9. Jing Xu & Alan T. Murray, 2019. "Spatial variability in retail gasoline markets," Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 581-603, June.
    10. Xavier Vanssay & Can Erutku, 2011. "Damage at the Pump: Does Punishment Fit the Crime?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 351-367, December.
    11. José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro & José Luis Torres, 2014. "Price Hysteresis After Antitrust Enforcement: Evidence From Spanish Food Markets," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 217-256.
    12. Clark, Robert & Fabiilli, Christopher & Lasio, Laura, 2022. "Collusion in the US generic drug industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).

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