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Large-Scale Institutional Changes: Land Demarcation in the British Empire

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  • Gary D. Libecap
  • Dean Lueck
  • Trevor O'Grady

Abstract

We examine adoption of land demarcation in the British Empire during the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries. We develop a model and test its implications against data from temperate British colonies in North America, Australia, and New Zealand. Three arrangements were implemented: individualized, idiosyncratic metes and bounds; a centralized, uniform rectangular system; and a centralized, nonuniform demarcation system. The choice of arrangement is determined using demarcation, topographical, and soil quality data sets with qualitative, historical information. We find that centralized systems provide coordination benefits, but adoption is less likely when implementation is slow and controlling settlement is costly. In centralized systems, we find that uniform rectangular demarcation lowers transaction costs, but its rigid structure is costly in rugged terrain, and alternatives are adopted.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck & Trevor O'Grady, 2011. "Large-Scale Institutional Changes: Land Demarcation in the British Empire," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages 295-327.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/662185
    DOI: 10.1086/662185
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    Cited by:

    1. Gwaleba, Method Julius & Chigbu, Uchendu Eugene, 2020. "Participation in property formation: Insights from land-use planning in an informal urban settlement in Tanzania," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    2. Benito Arruñada, 2017. "How to Make Land Titling more Rational," Working Papers 983, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, 2011. "The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Property Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(3), pages 426-467.
    4. Cai,Yongyang & Selod,Harris & Steinbuks,Jevgenijs, 2015. "Urbanization and property rights," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7486, The World Bank.
    5. Eric H. Wilhelm, 2024. "Settlement growth and military conflict in early colonial New England 1620–1700," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 435-464, June.
    6. Bryan Leonard & Gary D. Libecap, 2016. "Collective Action by Contract: Prior Appropriation and the Development of Irrigation in the Western United States," NBER Working Papers 22185, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Gary D. Libecap, 2018. "Property Rights to Frontier Land and Minerals: US Exceptionalism," NBER Working Papers 24544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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