Large-Scale Institutional Changes: Land Demarcation in the British Empire
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DOI: 10.1086/662185
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- Benito Arruñada, 2017. "How to make land titling more rational," Economics Working Papers 1575, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2018.
- Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, 2011. "The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Property Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(3), pages 426-467.
- Cai,Yongyang & Selod,Harris & Steinbuks,Jevgenijs, 2015. "Urbanization and property rights," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7486, The World Bank.
- Eric H. Wilhelm, 2024. "Settlement growth and military conflict in early colonial New England 1620–1700," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 435-464, June.
- Bryan Leonard & Gary D. Libecap, 2016. "Collective Action by Contract: Prior Appropriation and the Development of Irrigation in the Western United States," NBER Working Papers 22185, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary D. Libecap, 2018. "Property Rights to Frontier Land and Minerals: US Exceptionalism," NBER Working Papers 24544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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