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Learning by Striking: Estimates of the Teetotaler Effect

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  • Schnell, John F
  • Gramm, Cynthia L

Abstract

The authors hypothesize that past strike experience will have a negative or "teetotaler" effect on a collective bargaining unit's propensity to strike in future negotiations, other things being equal. They test this using a unique micro-level sample comprising four consecutive negotiations by 147 bargaining units in U.S. manufacturing industries, controlling for observable and unobservable differences among bargaining pairs in the propensity to strike. The results are consistent with the view that the experience of striking is, indeed, sobering: lagged strike experience variables have a significantly negative effect on the propensity to strike in the current negotiation. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Schnell, John F & Gramm, Cynthia L, 1987. "Learning by Striking: Estimates of the Teetotaler Effect," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(2), pages 221-241, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:5:y:1987:i:2:p:221-41
    DOI: 10.1086/298145
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Rich & Joseph Tracy, 2004. "Uncertainty and Labor Contract Durations," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(1), pages 270-287, February.
    2. Alex Lehr & Agnes Akkerman & René Torenvlied, 2015. "Spillover and conflict in collective bargaining: evidence from a survey of Dutch union and firm negotiators," Work, Employment & Society, British Sociological Association, vol. 29(4), pages 641-660, August.
    3. Alex Lehr & Jana Vyrastekova & Agnes Akkerman & René Torenvlied, 2018. "Horizontal and vertical spillovers in wage bargaining: A theoretical framework and experimental evidence," Rationality and Society, , vol. 30(1), pages 3-53, February.
    4. George Neumann, 1996. "Search Models and Duration Data," Econometrics 9602008, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Mar 1996.
    5. William H. Greene & Ana P. Martins, 2002. "Striking Features of the Labor Market," EERI Research Paper Series EERI RP 2002/08, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
    6. William H. Greene & Ana P. Martins, 2013. "Striking Features of the Labor Market: Theory," Journal of Economics and Econometrics, Economics and Econometrics Society, vol. 56(2), pages 1-24.
    7. Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, 2009. "Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(539), pages 1189-1207, July.
    8. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2004. "Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 129, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    9. Bradley R. Weinberg, 2020. "Third-Party Intervention and the Preservation of Bargaining Relationships," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 73(2), pages 498-527, March.
    10. William H. Greene & Ana P. Martins, 2013. "Striking Features of the Labor Market: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Economics and Econometrics, Economics and Econometrics Society, vol. 56(2), pages 25-53.
    11. Campolieti, Michele, 2015. "State dependence in the incidence of strikes: Evidence from Canadian contract data using Heckman’s dynamic probit model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 7-9.

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