IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/ecdecc/y2006v54i3p725-47.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Simple Model of Collective Action

Author

Listed:
  • Sethi, Rajiv
  • Somanathan, E

Abstract

Successful collective action is usually accompanied by explicit systems for punishing noncooperators. A simple model of collective action is presented in which such punishment opportunities are available, and some individuals have a taste for exercising them. The model suggests that many of the correlates of successful collective action in the commons management literature are endogenous, and it clarifies the channels through which others operate. It points to the importance of communication costs and asymmetries in power rather than wealth in explaining when collective action fails. Heterogeneity in the ability to inflict punishment or be hurt by it may result in collective action becoming infeasible, especially when there are increasing returns in the production of the public good, but there is a range of parameters in which heterogeneity is favorable to cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 2006. "A Simple Model of Collective Action," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(3), pages 725-747, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:y:2006:v:54:i:3:p:725-47
    DOI: 10.1086/500035
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/500035
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/500035?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Beil Richard O., 1993. "Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 485-504, July.
    2. Charness, Gary, 2000. "Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 177-194, November.
    3. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
    4. Hackett Steven & Schlager Edella & Walker James, 1994. "The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 99-126, September.
    5. Talbot Page & Louis Putterman & Bulent Unel, 2005. "Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 1032-1053, October.
    6. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, April.
    7. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 124-124.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Libois, François, 2022. "Success and failure of communities managing natural resources: Static and dynamic inefficiencies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    2. Ranjan, Ram, 2014. "Linking common property resource management to human capital outcomes," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 139-153.
    3. Tavoni, Alessandro & Schluter, Maja & Levin, Simon, 2010. "The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management," Sustainable Development Papers 96843, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    4. Naidu, Sirisha C., 2009. "Heterogeneity and Collective Management: Evidence from Common Forests in Himachal Pradesh, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 676-686, March.
    5. Girard, Victoire, 2011. "The impact of inter-group relationships on intra-group cooperation. A case study in rural India," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011 32, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
    6. Marina Della Giusta, 2010. "Social Capital and Economic Development," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2010-02, Department of Economics, University of Reading.
    7. Sung Ha Hwang, 2009. "Larger groups may alleviate collective action problems," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2009-05, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
    2. Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 2004. "Collective action in the commons: A theoretical framework for empirical research," Discussion Papers 04-21, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    3. Demichelis, Stefano & Weibull, Jörgen, 2006. "Efficiency, communication and honesty," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 645, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 28 Nov 2006.
    4. Peter H. Kriss & Roberto Weber, 2013. "Organizational formation and change: lessons from economic laboratory experiments," Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2007. "When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 331-344, September.
    6. Benjamin Ouvrard & Stefan Ambec & Arnaud Reynaud & Stéphane Cezera & Murudaiah Shivamurthy, 2022. "Sharing rules for a common-pool resource in a lab experiment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 605-635, October.
    7. Tarui, Nori & Mason, Charles F. & Polasky, Stephen & Ellis, Greg, 2008. "Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 37-51, January.
    8. Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2009. "Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1850-1877, December.
    9. Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018. "Coordination with communication under oath," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 627-649, September.
    10. Francesco Feri & Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Sutter, 2010. "Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination—Large-Scale Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1892-1912, September.
    11. Fehr, Dietmar, 2017. "Costly communication and learning from failure in organizational coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 106-122.
    12. Elinor Ostrom & Harini Nagendra, 2007. "Tenure alone is not sufficient: monitoring is essential," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 8(3), pages 175-199, September.
    13. Jingjing Zhang, 2012. "Communication in asymmetric group competition over public goods," ECON - Working Papers 069, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    14. Villena, Mauricio G. & Zecchetto, Franco, 2011. "Subject-specific performance information can worsen the tragedy of the commons: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 330-347, June.
    15. Al-Mutairi, M.S. & Hipel, K.W. & Kamel, M.S., 2008. "Trust and cooperation from a fuzzy perspective," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 76(5), pages 430-446.
    16. Ostrom, Elinor, 2006. "The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 149-163, October.
    17. Erik O. Kimbrough & Alexander Vostroknutov, 2016. "Norms Make Preferences Social," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 608-638, June.
    18. Banerjee, Simanti & Cason, Timothy N. & de Vries, Frans P. & Hanley, Nick, 2017. "Transaction costs, communication and spatial coordination in Payment for Ecosystem Services Schemes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 68-89.
    19. Timothy N. Cason & Roman M. Sheremeta & Jingjing Zhang, 2015. "Asymmetric and Endogenous Communication in Competition between Groups," Working Papers 15-01, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    20. Jingjing Zhang, 2009. "Communication in Asymmetric Group Competition over Public Goods," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-06, McMaster University.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:y:2006:v:54:i:3:p:725-47. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/EDCC .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.