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Union Presence and Executive Compensation: An Exploratory Study

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  • PARBUDYAL SINGH
  • NARESH C. AGARWAL

Abstract

While executive compensation has historically attracted considerable attention and controversy, this issue is becoming increasingly more contentious as organizations attempt to cut labor costs through re-engineering and downsizing. Unions, governments, and workers are becoming critical of seemingly excessive executive compensation while employees are asked to make concessions. In fact, many labor organizations are specifically targeting executive compensation for criticisms: Witness their web sites tracking executive pay and numerous press releases and public statements. However, do unions, through their presence in a firm, affect executive compensation? While there is considerable research on the determinants and correlates of executive compensation, the literature is silent on the role of unions. We investigate the distinctive effects of union presence with data on a sample of Canadian-based metal-mining firms. The differences between union and nonunion firms, as well as the unique effects of union presence, are analyzed and future research suggested.

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  • Parbudyal Singh & Naresh C. Agarwal, 2002. "Union Presence and Executive Compensation: An Exploratory Study," Journal of Labor Research, Transaction Publishers, vol. 23(4), pages 631-646, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:tra:jlabre:v:23:y:2002:i:4:p:631-646
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rafael Gomez & Konstantinos Tzioumis, 2006. "What Do Unions Do to Executive Compensation?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0720, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    2. Boodoo, Muhammad Umar, 2018. "Do heavily-unionized companies compensate their CEOs less in periods of financial distress? Evidence from Canadian companies during the financial crisis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69601, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Muhammad Umar Boodoo, 2016. "Do heavily-unionized companies compensate their CEOs less in periods of financial distress? Evidence from Canadian companies during the financial crisis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67557, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Dyballa, Katharina & Kraft, Kornelius, 2016. "How Do Labor Representatives Affect Incentive Orientation of Executive Compensation?," IZA Discussion Papers 10153, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Chantziaras, Antonios & Dedoulis, Emmanouil & Leventis, Stergios, 2020. "The impact of labor unionization on monitoring costs," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 288-307.
    6. Min Park, 2021. "Unionized employees’ influence on executive compensation: Evidence from Korea," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 59(4), pages 1049-1083, December.
    7. Dyballa, Katharina & Kraft, Kornelius, 2015. "Does codetermination affect the composition of variable versus fixed parts of executive compensation?," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-053, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    8. Franco GANDOLFI & Magnus HANSSON, 2015. "A Global Perspective on the Non-Financial Consequences of Downsizing," REVISTA DE MANAGEMENT COMPARAT INTERNATIONAL/REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE MANAGEMENT, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 16(2), pages 185-204, May.
    9. Ishita Chatterjee & Bibhas Saha, 2011. "Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining and Managerial Incentives: Implications for Efficiency and Distribution," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 028, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

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