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Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods

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    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

  • ,

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

Abstract

In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set $A = A_1\times\cdots\ldots{}A_m$ of $m$ finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over $A$, namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over $A$.

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  • , & ,, 2012. "Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:909
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    Cited by:

    1. Bahel, Eric & Sprumont, Yves, 2021. "Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 94-99.
    2. Mishra, Debasis & Roy, Souvik, 2012. "Strategy-proof partitioning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 285-300.
    3. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2018. "Strategy-proof location of public facilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 21-48.
    4. Lionel Richefort, 2018. "Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1211-1238, November.
    5. Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia, 2019. "Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 25-105.
    6. Eric Bahel & Yves Sprumont, 2020. "Strategy-proof choice under monotonic additive preferences," Cahiers de recherche 2020-06, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    7. Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi, 2020. "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 219-238.
    8. Eric BAHEL & Yves SPRUMONT, 2017. "Strategyproof Choice of Acts : Beyond Dictatorship," Cahiers de recherche 03-2017, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    9. Reffgen, Alexander, 2015. "Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 349-383.
    10. BAHEL, Eric & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2017. "Strategyproof choice of acts: beyond dictatorship," Cahiers de recherche 2017-01, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multiple public goods; strategy-proofness; voting under constraints; additive preferences; separable preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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