Quid pro quo: friendly information exchange between rivals
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- Andreas Blume & In-Uck Park, 2020. "Quid pro Quo: Friendly Information Exchange between Rivals," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 20/733, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
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More about this item
Keywords
Alternating information disclosure; dynamic communication; two-sided incomplete information;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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