IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/regstd/v36y2002i8p877-895.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The La¨nder are the Building Blocks of the German Capital Market

Author

Listed:
  • Dariusz Wojcik

Abstract

Data on major voting blocks in the German officially listed companies for the end of 1997 and May 2001 are used in order to explore the spatial dimensions of the system of corporate control. Listed companies are very unevenly distributed, and their institutional and geographical concentration has not decreased. Holdings of voting blocks in companies are, in turn, getting more and more dispersed, but the majority of corporate control is still intraregional, with the holders of voting rights coming from the same Lander as the controlled corporations. Gravity equations show that distance is a very strong determinant of corporate control links, and its role applies to all types of companies and holders, though to a varying degree. From the perspective of corporate control, the German capital market is very regionalized. Considering that the study spans a short period of time, however, the pace of integration is pronounced. A partir des donnees sur les principaux regroupements de votes dans les societes allemandes officiellement cotees en Bourse fin 1997 et au mois de mai 2001, on examine les dimensions geographiques du systeme de controle des societes. Les societes cotees en Bourse sont distribuees de facon irreguliere, et leur concentration institutionnelle et geographique n'a pas diminue. Les actions detenues par les regroupements de votes deviennent, a leur tour, de plus en plus dispersees alors que, dans une large mesure, le controle des societes reste intraregional, dont les porteurs avec droit de vote viennent des memes Landers ou se trouvent les societes controlees. Des equations de gravite laissent voir que la variable distance constitue un facteur cle des liens de controle des societes, et son role s'applique de facon variable a toute sorte de societe et a toute categorie de porteur. Du point de vue du controle des societes, le marche financier allemand est tres regionalise. Etant donne que l'etude porte sur une periode de temps assez breve, il n'en est moins vrai que le taux d'integration s'avere marque. Daten fur die Hauptstimmblocke in den offiziell notierten deutschen Handelsgesellschaften fur Ende 1997 und Mai 2001 werden dazu benutzt, die raumlichen Dimensionen des Systems gemeinsamer Aufsichtsfuhrung zu untersuchen. Im Firmenregister aufgefuhrte Gesellschaften sind sehr ungleich verteilt, und ihre institutionalle und geographische Konzentration hat nicht abgenommen. Anteile der Stimmblocke in Gesellschaften wiederum unterliegen immer weitreichenderer Zersplitterung, doch der Grossteil der gemeinsamen Aufsicht befindet sich weiterhin innerhalb einer Region, wobei die Aktionare der Stimmrechte in den gleichen Landern ansassig sind wie die von ihnen beaufsichtigte Korporation. Schwerpunktsgleichungen zeigen, dass Entfernung ein ausserst starker Bestimmungsfaktor gemeinsamer Aufsichtsratverbindungen ist, und seine Rolle gilt fur alle Unternehmenstypen und Aktionare, obschon Unterschiede vorkommen. Aus der Perspektive gemeinsamer Aufsicht prasentiert der deutsche Kapitalmarkt sich als ein stark regional bestimmter. In Anbetracht der hier behandelten kurzen Zeitspanne, lasst sich jedoch ein ausgesprochen rasches Tempo der Integration beobachten.

Suggested Citation

  • Dariusz Wojcik, 2002. "The La¨nder are the Building Blocks of the German Capital Market," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(8), pages 877-895.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:regstd:v:36:y:2002:i:8:p:877-895
    DOI: 10.1080/0034340022000012315
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0034340022000012315
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/0034340022000012315?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 265, OECD Publishing.
    2. Rolf Sternberg & Christine Tamasy, 1999. "Munich as Germany's No. 1 High Technology Region: Empirical Evidence, Theoretical Explanations and the Role of Small Firm/Large Firm Relationships," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(4), pages 367-377.
    3. Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, 2002. "Corporate control in Europe," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 112(4), pages 471-498.
    4. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    5. Jonathan Story & Ingo Walter, 1997. "Political Economy of Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle of the Systems," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262692031, April.
    6. Barca, Fabrizio & Becht, Marco (ed.), 2001. "The Control of Corporate Europe," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247424.
    7. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    8. Marco Becht & Fabrizio Barca, 2001. "The control of corporate Europe," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13302, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    9. Krätke Stefan, 1999. "Wem gehört die Hauptstadt ?: Interregionale Kapitalverfiechtungen des Berliner Unternehmenssektors," ZFW – Advances in Economic Geography, De Gruyter, vol. 43(1), pages 65-75, October.
    10. Dariusz WÛjcik, 2002. "Cross-border corporate ownership and capital market integration in Europe: evidence from portfolio and industrial holdings," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(4), pages 455-491, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dariusz Wójcik, 2003. "Change in the German Model of Corporate Governance: Evidence from Blockholdings 1997–2001," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 35(8), pages 1431-1458, August.
    2. Weber, Anke, 2009. "An empirical analysis of the 2000 corporate tax reform in Germany: Effects on ownership and control in listed companies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 57-66, March.
    3. San Martin-Reyna, J.M. & Duran-Encalada, Jorge A., 2012. "The relationship among family business, corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from the Mexican stock exchange," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 106-117.
    4. Randall Morck, 2011. "Finance and Governance in Developing Economies," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 375-406, December.
    5. Heiko Karle & Tobias J. Klein & Konrad O. Stahl, 2011. "Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series 3380, CESifo.
    6. Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Family Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2167-2201, October.
    7. Heitor Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2005. "A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups," NBER Working Papers 11368, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Donatella Gatti, 2009. "Macroeconomic effects of ownership structure in OECD countries ," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 18(5), pages 901-928, October.
    9. Erik Berglöf & Mike Burkart, 2003. "European takeover regulation [‘Efficient and inefficient sales of corporate control’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 18(36), pages 171-213.
    10. Robert Chirinko & Hans Van Ees & Harry Garretsen & Elmer Sterken, 2004. "Investor Protections and Concentrated Ownership: Assessing Corporate Control Mechanisms in the Netherlands," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(2), pages 119-138, May.
    11. Bennedsen, Morten & Meisner, Kasper, Nielsen, 2006. "The Principle of Proportionality," Working Papers 22-2005, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    12. Peter Cziraki & Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, 2010. "Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 16(5), pages 738-777, November.
    13. Thomsen, Steen & Pedersen, Torben & Kvist, Hans Kurt, 2006. "Blockholder ownership: Effects on firm value in market and control based governance systems," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 246-269, January.
    14. Sergey Stepanov, 2013. "Shareholder Protection and Outside Blockholders: Substitutes or Complements?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(2), pages 355-381, June.
    15. Marc Goergen, 2005. "Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence From Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 21(2), pages 243-268, Summer.
    16. Jeremy Grant & Thomas Kirchmaier, 2004. "Corporate Ownership Structure and Performance in Europe," CEP Discussion Papers dp0631, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    17. Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal & André L. Carvalhal & Ana Paula Iervolino, 2015. "One Decade of Evolution of Corporate Governance Practices in Brazil," Brazilian Review of Finance, Brazilian Society of Finance, vol. 13(1), pages 134-161.
    18. Pombo, Carlos & Taborda, Rodrigo, 2017. "Stock liquidity and second blockholder as drivers of corporate value: Evidence from Latin America," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 214-234.
    19. Sergei Guriev & Andrei Rachinsky, 2004. "Ownership concentration in Russian industry," Working Papers w0045, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    20. Javakhadze, David & Ferris, Stephen P. & Sen, Nilanjan, 2014. "An international analysis of dividend smoothing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 200-220.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:regstd:v:36:y:2002:i:8:p:877-895. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/CRES20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.