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Russian anti-trust policy: power of enforcement versus quality of rules

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  • Svetlana Avdasheva
  • Andrei Shastitko

Abstract

In recent years the role of anti-monopoly policy in Russia has grown significantly. The enforcement power of the anti-trust agency has increased dramatically. At the same time adverse trends in competition policy have emerged and strengthened. The main reason was, paradoxically, a growing role of anti-trust policy in the Russian government. The enforcement of anti-trust rules is expected to result immediately in control of the price level and/or support of a defined group of market participants (e.g. suppliers of food products). In this context legal rules are changing in a way that leads to an increase in the number of false positives (type I errors) in anti-trust cases. False positives not only impose a burden on the accused but also distort the incentives of market participants, restrain potentially efficient business practices and also paradoxically can prevent competition. This article considers three examples of adverse development of anti-trust rules in Russia: regulation of trading activity, rules on collusion and excessive prices of collectively dominant market participants, and rules on discrimination as an abuse of a dominant position.

Suggested Citation

  • Svetlana Avdasheva & Andrei Shastitko, 2011. "Russian anti-trust policy: power of enforcement versus quality of rules," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 493-505, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:pocoec:v:23:y:2011:i:4:p:493-505
    DOI: 10.1080/14631377.2011.622571
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Radaev, Vadim (Радаев, Вадим), 2018. "One More Regulatory Impact Assessment of the Trade Law: Are There Cumulative Effects over Time? [К Оценке Регулирующего Воздействия Закона О Торговле: Накапливаются Ли Эффекты?]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 3, pages 28-61, June.
    2. Dmitrii Tereshchenko, 2022. "Competition among Russian Grocery Stores: Database on St. Petersburg, 2017–2021," HSE Working papers WP BRP 258/EC/2022, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    3. Svetlana Avdasheva & Svetlana Golovanova, 2017. "Oil explains all: desirable organisation of the Russian fuel markets (on the data of three waves of antitrust cases against oil companies)," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 198-215, April.
    4. Andrey V. Makarov, 2016. "Anti-Competitive Agreements in Russian Courts (2008 - 2012): Antitrust Law Implementation and Interpetation," HSE Working papers WP BRP 67/LAW/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    5. Svetlana Avdasheva & Polina Kryuchkova, 2013. "Law And Economics Of Antitrust Enforcement In Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 05/PA/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    6. Gyuzel Yusupova & Evgeniy Nesterenko, 2016. "Should "What is Done by Night Appear by Day"? An Optimal Design of the Leniency Program to Investigate Collusion," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 3, pages 91-120.
    7. Andrey V. Makarov, 2014. "Comparative Analusis Of Antitrust Policy Against Collusion In Some Transition Economies: Challenges For Effectiveness," HSE Working papers WP BRP 20/PA/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    8. Gyuzel Yusupova, 2013. "Leniency program and cartel deterrence in Russia: effects assessment," HSE Working papers WP BRP 06/PA/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    9. Avdasheva, Svetlana & Kryuchkova, Polina, 2015. "The ‘reactive’ model of antitrust enforcement: When private interests dictate enforcement actions – The Russian case," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 200-208.

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