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Two-Stage Contests With Additive Carryovers

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  • Sanghack Lee

Abstract

This paper examines two-stage contests in which players in two groups compete for a prize. In the first stage, each group selects a finalist through intra-group competition. In the second stage the finalists compete for the prize. The first-stage efforts are carried over to the second stage through the contest success function and cost functions. The carryover of efforts proves to increase aggregate efforts when the carryovers are player-specific. In the case of group-specific carryovers, however, the aggregate efforts may either increase or decrease in the carryover rates, depending upon the value of the exponent R of the contest success function. [D62, D72, D74]

Suggested Citation

  • Sanghack Lee, 2001. "Two-Stage Contests With Additive Carryovers," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 83-99.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:83-99
    DOI: 10.1080/10168730300080006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Sanghack, 2000. "Two-Stage Rent-Seeking Contests with Carryovers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 285-296, June.
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    8. Amegashie, J Atsu, 2000. "Some Results on Rent-Seeking Contests with Shortlisting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(3-4), pages 245-253, December.
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