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An Inquiry Into the Rationale for Economic Espionage

Author

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  • Merrill Whitney
  • James Gaisford

Abstract

Economic espionage can yield desirable strategic effects as well as cost savings for firms in a spying country. The spying country will typically gain even though counter-espionage operations will often be conducted by target countries. When two producing countries spy on each other, it is possible that both will be better off because of the technology transfer which is implicit in espionage. Economic espionage is generally beneficial to consumers. [F12, O031]

Suggested Citation

  • Merrill Whitney & James Gaisford, 1999. "An Inquiry Into the Rationale for Economic Espionage," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(2), pages 103-123.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:13:y:1999:i:2:p:103-123
    DOI: 10.1080/10168739900000040
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 329-343, March.
    2. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406.
    3. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    4. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Barrachina, Alex & Forner-Carreras, Teresa, 2022. "Market must be defended: The role of counter-espionage policy in protecting domestic market welfare," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    2. Jonas Send, 2021. "Contest Copycats: Adversarial Duplication of Effort in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2021-17, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    3. Joseph Pelzman, 2015. "PRC Outward Investment in the USA and Europe: A Model of R&D Acquisition," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 1-14, February.
    4. Alex Barrachina & Yair Tauman & Amparo Urbano, 2021. "Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 241-278, March.
    5. D. Thorleuchter & D. Van Den Poel, 2012. "Protecting Research and Technology from Espionage," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 12/824, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    6. Po-Lu Chen, 2016. "Cross-Country Economic Espionage and Investment in Research and Development," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 8(4), pages 146-155, April.
    7. Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2019. "Induced Price Leadership and (Counter-)Spying Rivals' Play under Incomplete Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 7476, CESifo.
    8. S. Ho, 2008. "Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 31-58, February.
    9. Barrachina, Alex & Tauman, Yair & Urbano, Amparo, 2014. "Entry and espionage with noisy signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 127-146.

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