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An 'exception culturelle'? French sensationist political economy and the shaping of public economics

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  • Gilbert Faccarello

Abstract

This paper examines some ideas developed in the field of public economics by French Sensationist political economists, from Turgot and Condorcet to the young Jean-Baptiste Say. An ideal-typical account of their position is based on the fact that issues raised by public expenditure and revenue are not dealt with independently. Instead, a strong link between the two sides of the budget is emphasized, an approach arising out of political considerations concerning human rights and equity. Following on from this they develop a theory of public expenditure based on public goods - national and local - and externalities, and a theory of taxation culminating in a justification of progressive taxation. The central section of the paper forms a kind of pivotal point in the analysis, showing how the above political and ethical requirements of the theory lead to the first estimation of the optimal amount of public expenditure and revenue - involving an equilibrium at the margin.

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  • Gilbert Faccarello, 2006. "An 'exception culturelle'? French sensationist political economy and the shaping of public economics," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 1-38.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:eujhet:v:13:y:2006:i:1:p:1-38
    DOI: 10.1080/09672560500522835
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    1. Musgrave, R.A., 1985. "A brief history of fiscal doctrine," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-59, Elsevier.
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    6. Alain Béraud & Gilbert Faccarello, 1999. "Nouvelle histoire de la pensée économique, tome 1," Post-Print halshs-00201472, HAL.
    7. Estlund, David M. & Waldron, Jeremy & Grofman, Bernard & Feld, Scott L., 1989. "Democratic Theory and the Public Interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1317-1340, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Poinsot, 2010. "The foundations of justice in Jules Dupuit's thought," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(4), pages 793-812.
    2. Blankart Charles B., 2015. "Politische Folgen finanzwissenschaftlicher Konzepte / Political consequence of public finance," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 61-80, January.

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