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Considering Collective Choice: The Route 328 Problem in Kodaira City

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  • Toyotaka Sakai

Abstract

A local referendum was held in Kodaira City, Tokyo on 26 May 2013, but the voting box remained sealed. This was because the voter turnout did not reach the 50% threshold for opening the box. Based on the Rousseauian view on voting, we argue that this hurdle is unjustifiable and further question the adequacy of the local referendum even without such a hurdle. Finally, we examine the use of economic mechanisms for this type of collective choice instead of voting.
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  • Toyotaka Sakai, 2017. "Considering Collective Choice: The Route 328 Problem in Kodaira City," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 68(3), pages 323-332, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:68:y:2017:i:3:p:323-332
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/jere.12115
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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