IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/apsrev/v83y1989i04p1317-1340_08.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Democratic Theory and the Public Interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Estlund, David M.
  • Waldron, Jeremy
  • Grofman, Bernard
  • Feld, Scott L.

Abstract

Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld argued in the June 1988 issue of this Review that Jean-Jacques Rousseau's contributions to democratic political theory could be illuminated by invoking the theorizing of one of his eighteenth-century contemporaries, the Marquis de Condorcet, about individual and collective preferences or judgments. Grofman and Feld's claims about collective consciousness and the efficacy of the public interest provoke debate. One focus of discourse lies in the application of Condorcet's jury theorem to Rousseau's theory of the general will. In this controversy David M. Estlund and Jeremy Waldron in turn raise a variety of issues of theory and interpretation; Grofman and Feld then extend their argument, and propose clarifications.

Suggested Citation

  • Estlund, David M. & Waldron, Jeremy & Grofman, Bernard & Feld, Scott L., 1989. "Democratic Theory and the Public Interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1317-1340, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1317-1340_08
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055400088183/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dietrich, Franz & Spiekermann, Kai, 2012. "Independent opinions? on the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems," MPRA Paper 40137, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2010.
    2. Dietrich, F.K., 2008. "The premises of condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified," Research Memorandum 012, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    3. Dietrich, Franz & Spiekermann, Kai, 2010. "Epistemic democracy with defensible premises," MPRA Paper 40135, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2012.
    4. Ladha, Krishna K., 1995. "Information pooling through majority-rule voting: Condorcet's jury theorem with correlated votes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 353-372, May.
    5. Melissa Schwartzberg, 2003. "Rousseau on Fundamental Law," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 51(2), pages 387-403, June.
    6. Alessandra Arcuri & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2010. "Centralization versus Decentralization as a Risk-Return Trade-Off," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 359-378, May.
    7. Gilbert Faccarello, 2006. "An 'exception culturelle'? French sensationist political economy and the shaping of public economics," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 1-38.
    8. Daniel Duma, 2015. "Voting Rules And Redistribution: The Case Of The Recent Economic Crisis," Annals - Economy Series, Constantin Brancusi University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 3, pages 183-189, June.
    9. George Masterton & Erik J. Olsson & Staffan Angere, 2016. "Linking as voting: how the Condorcet jury theorem in political science is relevant to webometrics," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 106(3), pages 945-966, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1317-1340_08. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/psr .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.