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Collective action and the common enemy effect

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  • Kris De Jaegher
  • Britta Hoyer

Abstract

How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).

Suggested Citation

  • Kris De Jaegher & Britta Hoyer, 2016. "Collective action and the common enemy effect," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(5), pages 644-664, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:27:y:2016:i:5:p:644-664
    DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2014.925676
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Konrad, Kai A., 2024. "The collective security dilemma of preemptive strikes," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(3), pages 1191-1199.
    2. Mathews, Timothy & Paul, Jomon A., 2022. "Natural disasters and their impact on cooperation against a common enemy," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 303(3), pages 1417-1428.
    3. Kris De Jaegher, 2021. "Common‐Enemy Effects: Multidisciplinary Antecedents And Economic Perspectives," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 3-33, February.
    4. Britta Hoyer & Kris De Jaegher, 2023. "Network disruption and the common-enemy effect," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 117-155, March.
    5. Carl, Noah, 2019. "Prevention of Armed Conflict in Europe: Comparing the Role of the EU and the US/NATO," SocArXiv ds8px, Center for Open Science.
    6. De Jaegher, Kris, 2017. "Harsh environments and the evolution of multi-player cooperation," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 1-12.

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