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Introductions of Invasive Species: Failure of the Weaker Link

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  • Burnett, Kimberly M.

Abstract

The prevention of invasive species is modeled as a “weaker link” public good. Under the weaker link aggregation technology, individual contributions beyond the lowest level will provide benefits, but these benefits progressively decline as contributions exceed the minimum. A two-region model is constructed, assuming incomplete information concerning costs of provision. This framework allows us to explain why we observe underinvestment in prevention, how information facilitates efficiency, and under what conditions information is most relevant. Specific implications regarding improved invasive species prevention policy are extracted and discussed.

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  • Burnett, Kimberly M., 2006. "Introductions of Invasive Species: Failure of the Weaker Link," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(1), pages 21-28, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:agrerw:v:35:y:2006:i:01:p:21-28_01
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    Cited by:

    1. Costello, Christopher & Quérou, Nicolas & Tomini, Agnes, 2017. "Private eradication of mobile public bads," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 23-44.
    2. Atallah, Shadi S. & Huang, Ju-Chin & Leahy, Jessica & Bennett, Karen, 2020. "Preference Heterogeneity and Neighborhood Effect in Invasive Species Control: The Case of Glossy Buckthorn in New Hampshire and Maine Forests," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304623, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    3. Eli Fenichel & Timothy Richards & David Shanafelt, 2014. "The Control of Invasive Species on Private Property with Neighbor-to-Neighbor Spillovers," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 59(2), pages 231-255, October.
    4. Kobayashi, Mimako & Melkonyan, Tigran A., 2011. "Strategic Incentives in Biosecurity Actions: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 36(2), pages 1-21, July.
    5. Lee, Donna J. & Adams, Damian C. & Kim, C.S., 2009. "Managing invasive plants on public conservation forestlands: Application of a bio-economic model," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 237-243, July.
    6. Sean F. Ellis & Mark Masters & Kent D. Messer & Collin Weigel & Paul J. Ferraro, 2021. "The Problem of Feral Hogs and the Challenges of Providing a Weak‐Link Public Good," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(3), pages 985-1002, September.
    7. Bate, Andrew M. & Jones, Glyn & Kleczkowski, Adam & MacLeod, Alan & Naylor, Rebecca & Timmis, Jon & Touza, Julia & White, Piran C.L., 2016. "Modelling the impact and control of an infectious disease in a plant nursery with infected plant material inputs," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 334(C), pages 27-43.
    8. Richard Cornes, 2016. "Aggregative Environmental Games," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(2), pages 339-365, February.
    9. Heikkila, Jaakko, 2006. "Economics of invasive alien species: pre-emptive versus reactive control," Discussion Papers 11865, MTT Agrifood Research Finland.
    10. Florec, Veronique & Sadler, Rohan J. & White, Ben & Dominiak, Bernie C., 2013. "Choosing the battles: The economics of area wide pest management for Queensland fruit fly," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 203-213.

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