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Third-Country Demand For Peacekeeping

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  • Ugurhan Berkok

Abstract

A third country's peacekeeping demand typically arises because of a conflict spilling over the national boundary, economically and politically as well as spatially, from the country in conflict. Economic and geographic proximities, as well as the intensity of the original conflict, increase the demand for peacekeeping by third countries. Moreover, strategic considerations such as free-riding may significantly alter the level of overall demand for peacekeeping. Discreteness in military technology and leadership by signalling may alleviate the collective action problem and increase peacekeeping contributions towards the optimum from their simple Nash equilibrium levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Ugurhan Berkok, 2006. "Third-Country Demand For Peacekeeping," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(5), pages 473-485.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:17:y:2006:i:5:p:473-485
    DOI: 10.1080/10242690600888239
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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