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Peacekeeping, Private Benefits and Common Agency

In: Handbook on the Economics of Conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Ugurhan G. Berkok
  • Binyam Solomon

Abstract

The Handbook on the Economics of Conflict conveys how economics can contribute to the understanding of conflict in its various dimensions embracing world wars, regional conflicts, terrorism and the role of peacekeeping in conflict prevention.

Suggested Citation

  • Ugurhan G. Berkok & Binyam Solomon, 2011. "Peacekeeping, Private Benefits and Common Agency," Chapters, in: Derek L. Braddon & Keith Hartley (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13624_11
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    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781848446496.00016.xml
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jyoti Khanna & Todd Sandler & Hirofumi Shimizu, 1999. "The Demand for UN Peacekeeping, 1975–1996," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 345-368, August.
    2. Seiglie Carlos, 2005. "Efficient Peacekeeping for a New World Order," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(2), pages 175-192, November.
    3. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Defense Economics," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 1.
    4. Hans Kammler, 1997. "Not for security only: The demand for international status and defence expenditure an introduction," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 1-16.
    5. Hirofumi Shimizu & Todd Sandler, 2002. "Peacekeeping and Burden-sharing, 1994-2000," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 39(6), pages 651-668, November.
    6. Jyoti Khanna & Todd Sandler & Hirofumi Shimizu, 1998. "Sharing the Financial Burden for U.N. and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976-1996," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(2), pages 176-195, April.
    7. Derek L. Braddon & Keith Hartley (ed.), 2011. "Handbook on the Economics of Conflict," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13624.
    8. Keith Hartley, 1997. "The cold war, great-power traditions and military posture: Determinants of British defence expenditure after 1945," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 17-35.
    9. Jyoti Khanna & Todd Sandler, 1997. "Conscription, peace-keeping, and foreign assistance: NATO burden sharing in the post-cold war era," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 101-121.
    10. Hirofumi Shimizu, 2005. "An economic analysis of the un peacekeeping assessment system," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 1-18.
    11. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
    12. Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler & Hirofumi Shimizu, 2009. "Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(6), pages 827-852, December.
    13. מחקר - ביטוח לאומי, 2006. "Summary for 2005," Working Papers 29, National Insurance Institute of Israel.
    14. Hirofumi Shimizu & Todd Sandler, 2003. "NATO Peacekeeping and Burden Sharing: 1994-2000," Public Finance Review, , vol. 31(2), pages 123-143, March.
    15. Sandler, Todd & Khanna, Jyoti & Shimizu, Hirofumi, 1998. "Sharing the Financial Burden for Un and Nato Peacekeeping: 1976-96," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1216, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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