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The effects of optimism bias in teams

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Listed:
  • Jian Wang
  • Xintian Zhuang
  • Jun Yang
  • Jiliang Sheng

Abstract

This article imports a behavioural perspective into a team context to study the effort-coordination problem among agents. Specifically, we investigate how the presence of optimism bias impacts the severity of the free-rider problem, the organizational structure of the team and the compensation contracts offered to agents in equilibrium. The results indicate that all agents become more reluctant to exert effort and the team welfare decreases when some of its agents are optimistic, suggesting that optimism aggravates the free-rider problem in teams. Appointing a team leader makes all agents work harder, and the team benefits more by having the optimistic agent as its leader. These findings are in sharp contrast to the effects of overconfidence as identified in the literature. It is advisable to pay the optimistic agents less than the rational agents. Encouragingly, optimistic agents can learn about their own bias in the long run, leaving their team without too much detriment of optimism.

Suggested Citation

  • Jian Wang & Xintian Zhuang & Jun Yang & Jiliang Sheng, 2014. "The effects of optimism bias in teams," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(32), pages 3980-3994, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:46:y:2014:i:32:p:3980-3994
    DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2014.948678
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Clemens Buchen & Alberto Palermo, 2022. "Adverse Selection, Heterogeneous Beliefs, and Evolutionary Learning," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 343-362, June.

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