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Additional evidence for the career concern hypothesis with uncertainty of the retirement period - the case of professional baseball players in Japan

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  • Yasushi Ohkusa

Abstract

This paper examines whether the Career Concern Hypothesis, which Gibbons and Murphy (Journal of Political Economy, 100, 1992) have presented, holds in the labour market of professional baseball players in Japan. The hypothesis emphasizes that if workers are concerned about their career, an optimal compensation contract has two incentives - an explicit incentive from compensation for current performance and an implicit incentive from concern about their career - and predicts that the explicit incentive should be strongest for workers close to retirement because the concern for their career is weakest for these workers. Incorporating the uncertainty of the retirement period, evidences are found supporting the Career Concern Hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Yasushi Ohkusa, 1999. "Additional evidence for the career concern hypothesis with uncertainty of the retirement period - the case of professional baseball players in Japan," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(11), pages 1481-1487.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:31:y:1999:i:11:p:1481-1487
    DOI: 10.1080/000368499323346
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ohtake Fumio & Ohkusa Yasushi, 1994. "Testing the Matching Hypothesis: The Case of Professional Baseball in Japan with Comparisons to the United States," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 204-219, June.
    2. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
    3. Ohkusa, Yasushi & Ohtake, Fumio, 1996. "The relationship between supervisor and workers -- The case of professional baseball in Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 475-488, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wen-Jhan Jane, 2021. "The impact of cultural distance on salary: the case of Samurai Japan," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 11(1), pages 85-123, March.
    2. Akihiko Kawaura & Sumner J. La Croix, 2007. "The Designated Hitter Rule and Team Defensive Strategy in Japan's Professional Baseball Leagues," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 8(5), pages 491-504, October.
    3. Julio Del Corral & Carlos Pestana Barros & Juan Prieto-Rodríguez, 2008. "The Determinants of Soccer Player Substitutions," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 9(2), pages 160-172, April.
    4. Yasushi Ohkusa, 2001. "An Empirical Examination of the Quit Behavior of Professional Baseball Players in Japan," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 2(1), pages 80-88, February.

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