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Folk theorems in multicriteria repeated N-person games

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  • L. Petrosjan
  • J. Puerto

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • L. Petrosjan & J. Puerto, 2002. "Folk theorems in multicriteria repeated N-person games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 10(2), pages 275-287, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:10:y:2002:i:2:p:275-287
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02579020
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-948, July.
    2. Peter Borm & Freek van Megen & Stef Tijs, 1999. "A perfectness concept for multicriteria games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 49(3), pages 401-412, July.
    3. Gossner, Olivier, 1995. "The Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Mixed Strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(1), pages 95-107.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Repeated games; multicriteria games; 91A20; 90B50; 91A35;
    All these keywords.

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