Learning algorithms for joint resource block and power allocation in underlay D2D networks
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DOI: 10.1007/s11235-018-0438-0
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- Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 258-265, January.
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- Hilary I. Okagbue & Muminu O. Adamu & Timothy A. Anake & Ashiribo S. Wusu, 2019. "Nature inspired quantile estimates of the Nakagami distribution," Telecommunication Systems: Modelling, Analysis, Design and Management, Springer, vol. 72(4), pages 517-541, December.
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Keywords
Device-to-device networks; Joint resource block and power allocation; Fading memory joint strategy fictitious play with inertia; Fictitious play; Uncoupled stochastic learning; Potential games;All these keywords.
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