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Throughput-efficient coalition formation of selfish/altruistic nodes in ad hoc networks: a hedonic game approach

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  • Raza Umar

    (King Saud University
    University of Engineering and Technology)

  • Wessam Mesbah

    (King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals)

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the problem of throughput-efficient distributed coalition formation (CF) of selfish/altruistic nodes in ad hoc radio networks. We formulate the problem as a hedonic CF game with non-transferable utility and propose different preference relations (CF rules) based on individual/group rate improvement of distributed nodes. We develop a hedonic CF algorithm, through which distributed nodes may self-organize into stable throughput-efficient disjoint coalitions. We apply the concept of frequency reuse over different coalitions, such that the members of each coalition will transmit over orthogonal sub-bands with the available spectrum being optimally allocated among them. We study the computational complexity and convergence properties of the proposed hedonic CF algorithm under selfish and altruistic preferences, and present means to guarantee Nash-stability. In addition, we identify the scenarios in which a CF process might lead to instability (CF cycle), and we propose methods to avoid cycles and define different exit procedures if a CF cycle is inevitable. Performance analysis shows that the proposed algorithm with optimal bandwidth allocation provides a substantial gain, in terms of average payoff per link, over existing coalition formation algorithms for a wide SNR range.

Suggested Citation

  • Raza Umar & Wessam Mesbah, 2018. "Throughput-efficient coalition formation of selfish/altruistic nodes in ad hoc networks: a hedonic game approach," Telecommunication Systems: Modelling, Analysis, Design and Management, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 95-111, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:telsys:v:67:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11235-017-0323-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s11235-017-0323-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ray, Debraj, 2007. "A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199207954.
    2. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gianpiero Monaco & Luca Moscardelli & Yllka Velaj, 2021. "Additively Separable Hedonic Games with Social Context," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-14, September.

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