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Political Ecology of Nation-States with Examples from Chinese History

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  • Shixiong Cao

Abstract

States are autonomous political units that unite many communities within their territory, and whose centralized government has the power to collect taxes, draft citizens for work or war, and decree and enforce laws. States attempt to solve the problem of allocating scarce resources because the growth in human needs due to long-term, continuous population increases has always exceeded growth in the environmental carrying capacity. In these self-governed independent territories, people, communities, corporations, and public wealth are protected by complex combinations of individual and collective property rights. However, this stage of social institutional evolution may be forced to change as human populations decline (because many women now reject the option of having children) while improved science, technology, and social institutions solve or mitigate the problem of resource scarcity. In response, the political ecology of states will need to evolve to meet new challenges and develop new institutions that can promote environmentally sustainable social development. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Shixiong Cao, 2015. "Political Ecology of Nation-States with Examples from Chinese History," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 124(2), pages 445-462, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:soinre:v:124:y:2015:i:2:p:445-462
    DOI: 10.1007/s11205-014-0800-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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