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Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol

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  • Daniel Cardona
  • Arnold Polanski

Abstract

We analyze a rent-seeking contest that determines the bargaining protocol in a one-dimensional bargaining game, where agents preferences over social outcomes are single-peaked. We relate the incentives of agents to make unproductive and costly efforts/investments to the quota rules that are required to implement agreements. When the contest assigns persistent recognition probabilities, we find that simple majority minimizes the total investments and, hence, inefficiency. In case that the contest recurs each period, multiple equilibria exist with the particularity that in each equilibrium only one agent controls the agenda of the bargaining process. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Cardona & Arnold Polanski, 2013. "Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(2), pages 217-240, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:41:y:2013:i:2:p:217-240
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0681-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Britz, Volker, 2018. "Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 1-20.
    2. Daniel Diermeier & Carlo Prato & Razvan Vlaicu, 2016. "A bargaining model of endogenous procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 985-1012, December.
    3. Kazuo Yamaguchi, 2022. "Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 69-104, July.
    4. Kim, Duk Gyoo, 2019. "Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 161-175.

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