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A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case

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  • Rosa Camps
  • Xavier Mora
  • Laia Saumell

Abstract

A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they need not express a comparison between every pair of options. This includes the case where each voter gives an ordered list restricted to a subset of most preferred options. In this connection, the proposed method (except for one of the given variants) carefully distinguishes a lack of information about a given pair of options from a proper tie between them. As in the special case of complete individual votes, the proposed generalization is proved to have certain desirable properties, which include: the continuity of the rates with respect to the data, a decomposition property that characterizes certain situations opposite to a tie, the Condorcet–Smith principle, and clone consistency. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Rosa Camps & Xavier Mora & Laia Saumell, 2013. "A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1111-1142, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:4:p:1111-1142
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0663-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Markus Schulze, 2011. "A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 267-303, February.
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