What shall we do with the cyclic profile?
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0596-4
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Cited by:
- Stensholt, Eivind, 2015. "What Happened in Burlington?," Discussion Papers 2015/26, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
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