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What shall we do with the cyclic profile?

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  • Eivind Stensholt

Abstract

A Condorcet method for a single-seat preferential election is defined by the way it handles cases without a Condorcet winner. Such cases are described in terms of cyclic candidate triples. Sometimes election theory considers intricate patterns of intersecting cyclic triples. In practice, cyclic triples are rare, but they may be created as part of strategic voting against a Condorcet winner. This strategy, often called burying, is difficult to apply, but critics will detect a missed opportunity and regard it as a punishment for honest voting. A new Condorcet method, SV, lets a cyclic triple be won by the candidate with the smallest opportunity to defeat a Condorcet winner this way. A new geometric model allows visual comparison of the opportunities under various methods. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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  • Eivind Stensholt, 2013. "What shall we do with the cyclic profile?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 229-262, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:1:p:229-262
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0596-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Stensholt, Eivind, 2015. "What Happened in Burlington?," Discussion Papers 2015/26, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.

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