IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/nhhfms/2015_026.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

What Happened in Burlington?

Author

Listed:
  • Stensholt, Eivind

    (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics)

Abstract

Three visualization techniques illustrate the distribution of electoral preferences over a candidate triple. Two of them, introduced here, concern an IRV tally. The conditions that may allow the “pushover strategy” and the “No-Show Paradox”, are identified, and the practical consequences discussed. The controversial mayoral election of Burlington, Vermont, in 2009 is background. We see the IRV method in a legal and in a political context, presenting aspects of a judgment in the Minnesota Supreme Court 2009 and of the UK referendum over IRV in 2011. IRV is the single-seat version of STV. Both may achieve proportional voter influence with a designed disproportional distribution of seats in a legislature, e.g. as part of a potentially viable modus vivendi in ethnically divided societies.

Suggested Citation

  • Stensholt, Eivind, 2015. "What Happened in Burlington?," Discussion Papers 2015/26, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2015_026
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2356265
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dowding, Keith & Van Hees, Martin, 2008. "In Praise of Manipulation," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-15, January.
    2. Eivind Stensholt, 2013. "What shall we do with the cyclic profile?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 229-262, January.
    3. Moulin, Herve, 1988. "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 53-64, June.
    4. Stensholt, E., 1992. "Circle Pictograms for Vote Vectors," Papers 14-92, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stensholt, Eivind, 2020. "Anomalies of Instant Runoff Voting," Discussion Papers 2020/6, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    2. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2021. "Measuring Violations of Positive Involvement in Voting," Papers 2106.11502, arXiv.org.
    3. Stensholt, Eivind, 2019. "MMP-elections and the assembly size," Discussion Papers 2019/15, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    4. Eivind Stensholt, 2013. "What shall we do with the cyclic profile?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 229-262, January.
    5. De Donder, Philippe & Le Breton, Michel & Truchon, Michel, 2000. "Choosing from a weighted tournament1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 85-109, July.
    6. Holliday, Wesley H., 2024. "An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
    7. Núñez, Matías & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2017. "Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 9-17.
    8. M. Sanver & William Zwicker, 2012. "Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 371-398, July.
    9. Brandl, Florian & Peters, Dominik, 2022. "Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: A catalogue of characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    10. Conal Duddy, 2014. "Condorcet’s principle and the strong no-show paradoxes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 275-285, August.
    11. Joaquín Pérez & José L. Jimeno & Estefanía García, 2015. "No Show Paradox and the Golden Number in Generalized Condorcet Voting Methods," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 497-513, May.
    12. McMorris, F.R. & Mulder, Henry Martyn & Novick, Beth & Powers, Robert C., 2021. "Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 164-174.
    13. Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou, 2019. "Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation : the Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems," Working Papers hal-02185965, HAL.
    14. Bilge Yilmaz & Murat R. Sertel, 1999. "The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 615-627.
    15. David McCune & Adam Graham-Squire, 2023. "Monotonicity Anomalies in Scottish Local Government Elections," Papers 2305.17741, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    16. Brian Kogelmann, 2017. "Aggregating out of indeterminacy," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 16(2), pages 210-232, May.
    17. Nehring, Klaus & Puppe, Clemens, 2019. "Resource allocation by frugal majority rule," Working Paper Series in Economics 131, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    18. Eivind Stensholt, 2010. "Voces populi and the art of listening," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(2), pages 291-317, July.
    19. Stefano Vannucci, 2006. "The Proportional Lottery Protocol is Strongly Participatory and VNM-Strategy-Proof," Department of Economics University of Siena 490, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    20. Yasunori Okumura, 2019. "What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(2), pages 299-311, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electoral preferences; IRV tally; STV;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2015_026. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Stein Fossen (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dfnhhno.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.