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Third Parties in Equilibrium

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  • Hug, Simon

Abstract

Under standard assumptions, equilibria with three parties normally do not exist in spatial models of electoral competition. In this paper, the author shows that such equilibria are possible if it is assumed that voters are uncertain about the exact policies parties will adopt once elected. Substantive predictions can be derived from the model, explaining some features of three-party competition. First, the least-risk party will always take the most moderate position. Second, this position is also winning. Third, the two riskier parties are always on opposite sides of the median voter and also of the moderate party. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Hug, Simon, 1995. "Third Parties in Equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 82(1-2), pages 159-180, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:82:y:1995:i:1-2:p:159-80
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    Cited by:

    1. Haldun Evrenk, 2009. "Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: the base case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(1), pages 157-168, January.
    2. Jac C. Heckelman & Andrew J. Yates, 2008. "Senate Elections With Independent Candidates," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 31-46, January.
    3. Osborne, Martin J., 2000. "Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 41-62, July.
    4. José Manuel Cruz, 2004. "Empirical analysis of the influence of voters and politicians in the public choice of Portuguese municipalities universidade portucalense," ERSA conference papers ersa04p367, European Regional Science Association.
    5. James Adams, 1998. "Partisan Voting and Multiparty Spatial Competition," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 5-31, January.
    6. James F. Adams & Ernest W. Adams, 2000. "The Geometry of Voting Cycles," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(2), pages 131-153, April.
    7. Narwa, Daniel, 2001. "How general should the proximity model be?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 53-74, March.
    8. Jeffrey S. Rosenthal, 2019. "Many-Candidate Nash Equilibria for Elections Involving Random Selection," Methodology and Computing in Applied Probability, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 279-293, March.
    9. Peter-J. Jost & Stefanie Schubert & Miriam Zschoche, 2015. "Incumbent positioning as a determinant of strategic response to entry," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 577-596, March.

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