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Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice

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  • Toyotaka Sakai
  • Masaki Shimoji

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  • Toyotaka Sakai & Masaki Shimoji, 2006. "Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 435-445, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:26:y:2006:i:3:p:435-445
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-005-0028-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Inada, Ken-Ichi, 1969. "The Simple Majority Decision Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(3), pages 490-506, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Erdamar, Bora & Sanver, M. Remzi & Sato, Shin, 2017. "Evaluationwise strategy-proofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 227-238.
    2. Susumu Cato, 2014. "Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(4), pages 265-287, December.
    3. Yukinori Iwata, 2009. "Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 513-531, March.
    4. James Nguyen, 2019. "The limitations of the Arrovian consistency of domains with a fixed preference," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(2), pages 183-199, September.
    5. Shin Sato, 2012. "On strategy-proof social choice under categorization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 455-471, March.
    6. Yukinori Iwata, 2016. "The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 535-552, November.
    7. Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2011. "Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 143-149, March.

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