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The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination

Author

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  • Yukinori Iwata

    (Queen Mary University of London
    Nishogakusha University)

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce an Arrovian social choice framework with the process of nomination. We consider a two-stage social choice procedure in which some alternatives are first nominated by aggregating the opinions of nominators, and then the society makes a collective choice from the nominated alternatives by aggregating the preferences of voters. Each nominator’s opinion is a positive, negative, or neutral view as to whether each alternative deserves to be eligible for collective decision making. If a voter is a nominator, his preference space is restricted by his opinion as follows: he always prefers positive alternatives to neutral ones and neutral alternatives to negative ones, according to his opinion. When each nominating voter has such a preference space, we first characterize Arrow-consistent preference domains at the second stage of the social choice framework. Second, we find a resolution of Arrow’s impossibility theorem when at least one nominating voter exists.

Suggested Citation

  • Yukinori Iwata, 2016. "The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 535-552, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:81:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-016-9547-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-016-9547-y
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    Cited by:

    1. Yukinori Iwata, 2022. "Ranking nomination rules on the basis of nominating power distributions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(3), pages 382-401, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nomination; Nominating voters; Arrow-consistent preference domains; Arrow’s impossibility theorem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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