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The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles

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  • Ilia Tsetlin
  • Michel Regenwetter
  • Bernard Grofman

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Suggested Citation

  • Ilia Tsetlin & Michel Regenwetter & Bernard Grofman, 2003. "The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(3), pages 387-398, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:21:y:2003:i:3:p:387-398
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0269-z
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lehtinen, Aki, 2006. "Signal extraction for simulated games with a large number of players," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 50(9), pages 2495-2507, May.
    2. Chatterjee, Swarnendu & Storcken, Ton, 2020. "Frequency based analysis of collective aggregation rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 56-66.
    3. Núñez, Matías & Pivato, Marcus, 2019. "Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 285-305.
    4. Mor Nitzan & Shmuel Nitzan & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2018. "Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(3), pages 457-479, March.
    5. Rubinstein, Ariel & Segal, Uzi, 2012. "On the likelihood of cyclic comparisons," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2483-2491.
    6. Nicholas R. Miller, 2019. "Reflections on Arrow’s theorem and voting rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 113-124, April.
    7. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Borda rule is also intended for dishonest men," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 73-90, October.
    8. Salvatore Barbaro, 2024. "Electoral Methods and Political Polarization," Working Papers 2411, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
    9. James Green-Armytage & T. Tideman & Rafael Cosman, 2016. "Statistical evaluation of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 183-212, January.
    10. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2023. "Split Cycle: a new Condorcet-consistent voting method independent of clones and immune to spoilers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 1-62, October.
    11. Salvatore Barbaro & Nils D. Steiner, 2022. "Majority principle and indeterminacy in German elections," Working Papers 2202, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
    12. Ortona Guido, 2016. "A commonsense assessment of Arrow’s theorem," Journal of Heterodox Economics, Sciendo, vol. 3(1), pages 54-62, June.
    13. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 1-40, August.
    14. M. Braham & F. Steffen, 2007. "The Chairman’s Paradox Revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(2), pages 231-253, February.
    15. Lisa Sauermann, 2022. "On the probability of a Condorcet winner among a large number of alternatives," Papers 2203.13713, arXiv.org.
    16. Chatterjee, Swarnendu & Storcken, Ton, 2017. "Frequency Based Analysis of Voting Rules," Research Memorandum 006, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    17. Sara Wolk & Jameson Quinn & Marcus Ogren, 2023. "STAR Voting, equality of voice, and voter satisfaction: considerations for voting method reform," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 310-334, September.
    18. Dougherty, Keith L. & Heckelman, Jac C., 2020. "The probability of violating Arrow’s conditions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    19. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2020. "Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers," Papers 2004.02350, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.

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